your 2011 was astounding. for the arab spring, which i think partly inspired uprising in wisconsin, the home of ask me but also the of the john birch society. the john birch society that racist segregationist in episode rights, and thinking organization that was cofounded by fred tilton. that's right, the father of the oil baron charles and david koch. and then you move from the wisconsin uprising to protest against the keystone xl and the sum of 2011, then the u.n. climate to anyone who watches or listen to democracy now! you know we cover every climate summit from copenhagen to cancun from durbin to do all to pull in to the route to paris. you might say given what happened inside the summit, why waste the fuel? because it's not what happens

inside. it is what happens outside to the thousands who come from the most threatened part of the planet, who come to the summits to say like a 15 year old boy from the maldives, my country will be submerged like the people of southern africa who say they are the king. you are cooking our continent. turning to the historically greatest greenhouse gas emitter of all, the united states, demanding we change. they have debates the rest of the world. those i read what to do about climate change. our debates in this country, and immediate our whether human beings have anything to do with climate change -- >> live now to the arms control association forum in washington. speakers at today's daylong conference include white house deputy national security advisor ben rhodes, and a rush of atomic bomb survivor setsuko thurlow.

live coverage here on c-span2. >> we are very pleased to see as many of the year today, members, friends, reporters also. the support and contributions of our members are what makes our work possible. thank you very much for all that you do for us. we could not be here today without you. i also want to welcome those of you watching on c-span today. following the arms control association annual meeting for the next few hours. you can find out more about the arms control association, about our news and information and analysis that we provide, about weapons related security challenges and effective arms control solutions through our website, armscontrol.org. and you can also access our information and analysis, including our monthly journal arms control today on our new

app, yes, we have an app for smartphones and tablet computers. the latest in arms control information technology. the arms control that can be downloaded or used on appleton and went to amazon devices. if you don't know about that, if you need some technical assistance, we have some folks outside who can help you download your arms control after. we also encourage those of you here today and watching to engage with us through twitter with the hashtag arms-control 16. and as you can see from our program, we have organized a very substantive high level program today that's going to cover a range of nuclear weapons related secretive challenges facing the united states, the world and the next president of the united states.

and about what our an expert panel of leading experts on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear will discuss major challenges that they think will face the next president of the united states beginning in 2017. we are very honored also got as our second keynote speaker today that happiness is good adviser for strategic imitations for president barack obama, ben rhodes, who joined us from noon to 1:00 to talk about president obama's ongoing efforts to reduce the number, the role and the risk of nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and is also going to take questions from this audience. so that should be very interesting the noon hour. in the afternoon we will finish up with an expert panel discussion on the enormous budgetary cost of president obama's proposed plan to maintain and upgrade nuclear systems. and that panel is going to

discuss possible options and issues and choices for the next president and congress regarding those costs while still addressing key u.s. defense requirements. but first this when we're going to begin with our opening keynote speaker, and the awarding of the 2015 arms-control person of the year award. we will be hearing in a few minutes from the remarkable and indefatigable setsuko thurlow it was a 13 year old student at her school in hiroshima the morning that the u.s. air force detonated an atomic bomb on her city. in recognition of her efforts and all the hibakusha, the survivors of the hiroshima and not a sake bombing to ensure that no such horrors ever occur again, she was nominated for our 2015 arms-control person of the year award late last year.

so to introduce her and to present her with the award is the vice chairman of the arms control association board of directors paul walker. paul is a significant figure in arms-control field in his own right. he was recognized in 2013 as recipient of the prestigious award for decades in service to eliminate the threat imposed by chemical weapons the after paul's introduction, we will hear from her and she will take your questions for the next 45-50 minutes or so. so paul, if i could invite you to the podium. and setsuko, if you could come up as well, that would be great. >> good morning, everybody. nice to be here, nice to see so many friendly friendly and recognizable faces in the audience. and nice to see the with such good turnout today as well.

as credible and said my name is paul walker i work with a group founded by a felon or recognize him mikhail gorbachev. is the chairman of our group for about 23, 24 years. i'm delighted to be a today as vice chair of the board of the arms control association and i have the really very enjoyable task of presenting the 2015 arms-control person of the year award to setsuko thurlow. let me say just a few words about the award and that would make this determination. i know many of you here know that, know this already and have voted path over the years for our many annual award is but let me go over to do. every year since 2007 at the arms control association staff has nominate several individuals and institutions that have advanced effective arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament solutions and four raise awareness for the threats posed by massive cache of weapons.

each of last year's nominees in their own ways provide leadership to produce weapons related security threats, and iu conceived previous winners here in the 2007 in your program. setsuko thurlow in the hibakusha receive the highest number of votes in an online poll to determine the 2015 arms-control person of the year. setsuko thurlow and hibakusha of hiroshima and nagasaki were nobody for the unyielding dedication to sharing firsthand accounts of the catastrophic and inhumane effects of nuclear weapons which serves to reinforce a taboo against that of use of nuclear weapons and to maintain pressure for effective action to eliminate an outlaw nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons testing. i sharing their experience of the atomic bombings, setsuko who now resides in toronto, canada, and many other atomic bomb survivors like a replicate critical role in raising

awareness of human consequence of nuclear weapons use in promoting governmental leaders to take action to end the nuclear threat. very fitting that 70 years after the atomic bombings of the city of hiroshima and nagasaki, our online voter voters chose to hor those who express the horrors of nuclear weapons. i can imagine as a 13 year old myself experiencing a nuclear weapons explosion overhead. and that worked so hard and so tirelessly to ensure nuclear weapons are never used again as the 2015 arms-control person of year. that setsuko thurlow and the diminishing number of hibakusha are an inspiration to those who seek a safer world and a reminder of why the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons is so important, to quote our distinction director of the arms control association, daryl kimball. with that, setsuko, let me get the award and if you would come

up and i will present on behalf of the whole arms control association. many of you i'm sure with this prestigious award, and we're delighted, very pleased to have you with us here today. so here you go. [applause] >> thank you, thank you. >> so setsuko, i will let you now have, make a presentation. we would like to leave time. we have until about 10:00. we will try to leave time for questions and answers, and i will try to triage or manage our q&a after your presentation. the podium is yours. >> thank you very much, paul.

as utah, humbled, pleased to receive this beautiful -- i'm very happy to be here this morning and to meet with you, and to receive this honor, enter the chance to talk something about a little bit about my experiences, thoughts and feelings about nuclear weapons. i just made a last minute change in my plans. i'm just speaking from the heart. i just put the paper a way. really it was a total shock, surprise, to learn that i was going to receive the award from this organization. especially when i learned that

people on the board who voted for me. i didn't realize i had so many friends around the world, but i felt it was a miracle. and not only i but my fellow colleagues, the members of the hibakusha association in japan. they are together, ma remembered and honored with me. so on their behalf as well, let me give you my heartfelt thank you. thank you. now, i use the word miracle lightly, but really 71 years ago i did experience a miracle, and here i am in your company today. so i thought i would share my

personal experience with you. i know many of you expert, arms control specialist, and i'm sure you were quite well informed and knowledgeable of all kinds of human conditions, including the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. but i thought i would offer my personal and firsthand experience. in 1945, i was a 13 year old grade eight student integrals school, and on that very day -- in the girls school, that very day, a group of about 30 girls

have been recruited and trained to do the coding work of the top secret information. can you imagine, 13 year old girl doing such important thing? that shows the desperate japan was. i met the girls in front of the station at 8:00. know, before 8:00. at 8:00 at the military headquarters which was 1.8 kilometers from the ground zero. i was on the second floor and started the morning assembly, and the major davis cup talks. start proving your patriotism for ever, that kind of thing. we said yes, sir, we will do our best. when we did that i saw the white flash in the window, and then i

had -- floating up in the air. when i regained consciousness, in darkness, i instinctively tried to move my body. i couldn't move it so i knew i was faced with death. then i started hearing whispering voices with the girls around me. guard, help me. mother, help me. i'm here. so i knew i was surrounded by thin, although i couldn't see anybody in the darkness. then suddenly a strong male voice, don't give up. i'm trying to for you. he kept shaking my left shoulder from behind. he pushed me, keep kicking, keep pushing and you see the sun come through that opening. get out that way. crawl as quickly as possible. but by the time i get out of the building, it was on fire.

.net about 30 other girls who were with me in the same place were burned to death. but two of the girls managed to come out, so three of us looked around. although that happened in the morning, it was very dark, like twilight. and i started singing some moving back over approaching to me. and they happen to be streams of human beings, slowly shuffling from the center part of the city the way i was. they didn't look like human beings. their hair was standing straight up. bleeding. part of their bodies were missing. the skin and flesh were hanging

from the bones. and some were carrying their own eyeballs, you know, hanging from the eyesockets. and as they collapse onto the ground, this summit -- stretching out. the soldiers said you girls joined the procession to escape to the nearby hills. that's what we did, by carefully stepping over the dead bodies, injured bodies. it was a strange situation. nobody was running and calling for help or they just didn't have that kind of strength left. they were simply whispering, everybody was asking for water.

we girls were lightly injured, so by the time we got to the hillside, we went to the nearby stream and washed the blood and dirt and we soaked in the stream, to hold them over the mouth of the time people. you see, the place we escape to head the military training ground, huge place, about the size of two football fields. the place was packed with the dead and dying. we wanted to help, but everybody wanted the water, but no pockets to carry the water. that's why we did the rather primitive way. that's all we could do.

i looked around and see if there were any doctors and nurses, but i saw none of them in that huge place. that meant tens of thousands people in that place without medication, no medical attention, medications, ointments, nothing was provided within. just a few drops of water. that was the only rescue operation we could offer. we kept ourselves busy all day doing that. and, of course, all the doctors and nurses were killed, two, just a small percentage of a medical professionals survived, but they were serving people

somewhere else, not where i was. so when the doctors felt, we figured together with other people who escaped to the place. and all night we watched the empire city burn. feeling numb. from the massive scale of death and suffering we have witnessed. i was not responding appropriately, mortally. something happened to my psyche. they talk about the psyche closing off or psychic numbing. in ultimate situation like that, the sensation of the mortal takes place. i'm glad of that because if we

responded emotionally, to every horrific sight, i couldn't have survived. that's the end of that very day. other people can tell about being near the rivers and the rivers were full of floating dead bodies and so on, but i didn't see the river that day. but i will tell you about the people in my family, my friends, how they lost their life. that will give you just how the bomb affected human beings. i talked about 30 girls who were with me, but the rest of the students were at the city

center. the city was trying to establish the fire lanes to be prepared for the air raid. so all the grade seven and eighth grade students from all the high schools were recruited, brought to the center of the city, and they were providing the manual labor. now, they were in the center right below the detonation of the bomb. so they are the ones who simply vaporized, melted and carbonized. my sister-in-law was there with students. she was one of the teachers supervising the students. we tried to locate her, but we have never done so. on paper she is still missing.

but together with thousands of other students, oh, i understand there were several thousand students, seven, 8000 or so that simply disappeared from the face of the earth. the temperature of heat, i understand, was about 4000 degrees celsius. another story i can tell you is about my sister and her four year old child who came back to the city the night before to visit us. and during the morning there were walking over the bridge to the medical clinic, and both of them were burned beyond recognition. by the time i saw them the next day, their bodies were swollen

twice or three times larger than normal, and they kept begging for water. when they died, the soldiers dug up the hole and threw the bodies, poured gasoline, through the lighted match, and kept turning the body, this is half burned, not quite burned jet. yet. there i was, a 13 year old girl, standing just watching it. that memory troubles me for many years. what kind of human being and i? my dear sister been treated like an animal or insect or whatever your there was no human dignity associated with that kind of cremation.

the fact i didn't even shed tears troubled me for many years. i felt guilty. so later years as i went to university i started learning how human beings behave in ultimate conditions. was a big help. i could forgive myself after learning how our psyche automatically functions in a situation like that. but you know, it's the image of this four year old child, it's always there, and that image just guide me and is the driving force for my activism. because he came to represent all the innocent children of the world without understanding what was happening to them.

they agonized to death. so he is a special human being, special memory. if he is alive, he is 75 today. but regardless of time, he is still a four year old child guiding me. it was interesting, president obama made a lot of reference about innocent children, how we need to protect each one of them. and i was weeping, i couldn't help it. now, let me tell you another example how atomic bombs affect the human being. we rejoiced to hear my favorite uncle and aunt survived. they were okay. they didn't have any visible

sign of injuries. then several days later, we started hearing different story. they got sick, very sick. so after my sister and nephew died, my parents went over to my uncle's place, started looking after them. their body started showing purple spots all over the body. and according to my mother, who cared for them until they were dead, their internal organs seemed to be riding, -- riding, dissolving coming out as liquid until death. the entire innards from their bodies came out.

my mother used every material, newspaper come everything to use as diverse. but -- diapers. now, radiation was in many mysterious and random way to some people were killed immediately. some a week later, a month later, a year later. and that's horrible thing, 71 years later. people are still dying from the effect of the radiation. now, the struggle, hibakusha, in other words, survivor, hibakusha struggle was unexplainable in the aftermath, you know,

surviving in unprecedented catastrophic horror. and the unprecedented social and political chaos due to japan's defeat and occupation forces, strict control over us. if i start getting the detailed story of that, that will take the whole morning so maybe i will stop. but struggle in the aftermath was very difficult. now, i finished university in japan, and upon my graduation i was offered a scholarship, so i

came to virginia, very close to the city. and that was 1954. united states tested the biggest hydrogen bomb at the beginning in the south pacific that time, and creating that kind of situation in the kind of experience. -- hiroshima and nagasaki experience. entire japan was up in arms. ..

i was interviewed and i gave my honest opinion and i was fresh out of college and i told them what i thought. the united states nuclear policy was bad. look at all the killing and damage to the environment in the pacific and all of these kinds of days. the next day i started to see things better. how dare you go home, go back to japan. just a few days after my arrival, i encountered this kind of situation and i was horrified. what am i going to do?

i just arrived. i can't go back. i can't put a zipper over my mouth and pretend i never knew any a period when i be able to survive in the america? well, i spent the week. i just had to be alone. it was a painful and lonely time. the new country, i hardly knew anybody. but i am happy to say that i came out of that drama was more determined stronger conviction. if i don't speak up, who will?

it is my moral transparent the. i will share my experience to warn the world this is just the beginning of the nuclear arms and i just have to warn the world. so, that was the beginning. i am reminded of my time. where i think i asked wayne briefly why i have been doing what i have been doing. most of my adult life i have been speaking in high schools,

universities, women's groups, rotary clubs, anywhere people want to learn what it means to be in the nuclear age. or my i know the government says one in, but this is what i feel because i asked. they. i felt it was important. [applause] >> thank you. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, setsuko. i think it is extremely nothing as always to hear these stories from hiroshima and not a sake as well as radiation victims, since pacific islanders, context and,

like no victims, many, many answering out that often relate this to stomach turn because they have suffered in continue to suffer all the health illnesses from radiation poison all over the world. i will open it up to questions. i will post a first question to setsuko to get the ball rolling. we have about 25 minutes i think to continue discussion. first of all, give us a little sense of how you then came from virginia where i am so glad you were determined to speak truth to power as they say. how did you come from virginia to toronto, canada? idea of mac and then got a scholarship to come to virginia. now, the school gave me a full scholarship.

by that time, i had some sort of idea i wanted to become a social worker. in that situation, everybody made it out. and supporting netscape. i wanted to become a healthy person, somebody who can help and contribute to society and for that i need some professional golf training. and it at that time is not quite well-established. [inaudible] >> to the united states or canada? >> to the united states. then i went to the university of toronto. and then, i went back to japan and practiced social work.

so we came back to toronto and 62 in canada. and i have done social work on my life. >> i give you credit for sticking with it this many years. it is very important that you do. practically no one has experienced, that survived those bombings a real nuclear weapons explosion. it is not usual for people to really understand what it's all about. so with that, let me turn to the audience. i know there are many questions i could post, but i think i would rather turn to you and give you the opportunity to ask questions. right here on the front table.

please introduce yourself. because we are sun c-span2, wait for the microphone. >> alex leibowitz. i was wondering what people thought had happened. obviously, japan had experienced normal bombing from nonnuclear weapon, but here was something that was one explosion. the people understand that? they obviously didn't know the nuclear weapon. but if anything had happened in the blast came? >> well, my immediate reaction was nobody knew about a new type of weapon, so we thought it was unusual incendiary bomb because the united states started indiscriminate attack of major cities by the time about 7% of

the urban centers in japan were all rivals. i think it one night over 100,000 people were killed. i think amritsar b-29s blew over them and thousands of bombs, only one did the trick and most of the city different era. though we had no idea. it took some time before we knew clearly what it was. the government deported a new type of bomb. that was always knew. >> yes. right in the middle. >> carlos from italy. they would be many, many

questions to ask, but i will just stick to one. first of all, you said that you started your presentation indicating it was a miracle that you are alive. i think that all of us around here after all we are applied and it is a miracle since there were so many occasions almost on the border of the war, therefore we have a common situation. since you are a category, which unfortunately what is very important is to maintain the momentum of awareness of the international public opinion of that. i think that one of the major

events was president obama's visit to hiroshima. how do you want -- what is the best way to perpetuate testimony and the awareness and the people in your view to maintain the momentum of awareness. thank you. >> you mention, president obama to hiroshima. that was 600 reporters to the city and i think all around the world they have that kind of power and influence.

even i am toronto one that they i had eight interviews. can you imagine a tv station coming to my place asking what i talk about it. well, what power a president has. maybe he can do something like this, create the opportunity so he can mobilize. not just him, but all of us who know some in about this. i think we can identify are after is to make this issue credible and visible. i don't think we are doing enough. and i think -- i don't feel that the government is encouraging the people to learn what it is like to live in a nuclear age. maybe they think the ministry or department of education should be doing a better job.

but as i know, in japan and in canada and the united states, i don't think the school system is doing a good job either. i think more budget could be directed to those educational institutions and by the teaching and the family's homes. the children's parents grew up without knowing about it. so they avoid questioning the parents and the children learn not to raise the question because parents are horrified. that is a symbiotic kind of religion. but anyway, education system,

the government -- the government can look at the reality. about the survivors, the number number -- they have been leaving us with the jury about volition in their lifetime unfulfilled. it is very sad. i really take my hat off to the way they had dedicated their lives. we are at the same time very disappointed.

the public attention to us is limited. when i first came to the united states, people kept justifying hiroshima, the use of bombs. even today, the majority of people maintain that mentality. so that is how the progress we've made and the knowledge. i hope i am wrong. i would like to hear other peoples opinion on this. that's all. >> yes, right here. >> i know you spoke at the vienna conference on the humanitarian and packed with the open-ended working group in

geneva and nuclear weapons. the >> well, i have been working on the issue of nuclear disarmament for many years. but for a long time, i felt so much work was being done. people put so much emphasis on weapons systems and the theory of deterrence and they believe it and all the associated

topics. they were spending time to discuss, to catch up with government progress and not mind. i used to feel, my gosh, when we talk about the nuclear weapon, it is one of those things did to humanity. what happened to their lives, to their cities, but somehow that kind of attention was lacking. several years ago when i started hearing about humanitarian impact of nuclear weapon, i thought it's about time. we should be looking at this on a rail basis on the issue. of course that doesn't have the security of issue and some

people couldn't decide this movement by saying too much of the humanitarian. i don't think that's too much. but i was delighted. the attention was shifted to the humanitarian consequence. i was delighted to see this strong sentiment, the mounting interest on that topic around the world and not only the people ,-com,-com ma but the younger people, when we grow up, we want our world to be there for us to enjoy if i paid they are awake to push this idea.

so, i was very pleased to add. i am part of this movement. another thing which pleased me was the nuclear weapons states have the legal obligation to work toward disarmament under article vi. but they haven't had the wonderful feeling of obligation and not much was happening. it was a huge disappointment when i have learned. it's been in existence 45 years. the majority of nuclear weapons said but we have waited for us to take the lead.

we are not going to wait anymore. we are going to stand up and join our hands together and work with ngos and civil society. now, civil society, ngos and 127 nonnuclear weapon states. they are also work for prohibition and nuclear weapons and the legally binding instrument. for me, the majority of the nonnuclear weapon state is so impatient with the lack of progress and participation and

they want to and we have to see what we could do. standing up the so-called weak relations and working now and the most effect of measures. now, the entire world will wake up and they are ready to work. i think this is great. leaving the faith of the world, just five nuclear weapon states an additional for nuclear

weapons they. the united states want to keep what they have and their obligation. the whole world is waking up to realize the shared responsibility. a lot of young people involved in this movement is very good news for me. we have people to work with and some good ideas coming up. you people know all about that. >> this is a group of experts, setsuko. some of us know a little more

and then a little less in different areas. it is just wonderful to hear your impressions, which are very special and extremely important today because we don't hear all that much. even in washington d.c., let alone in japan, certainly in hiroshima nagasaki. it is very, very good and we have made progress to date largely because people like yourself and your colleagues made a stand as i say speaking truth to power on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. what i now do you think 126 countries have signed the humanitarian pledge. 127. i stand corrected they are. we have a couple more questions. will try to go through and keep the questions breathe.

i work with physicians for social responsibility i work -- who sends his greetings. you just answered a lot of my questions. they are working with the international campaign to promote the prohibition of nuclear weapons. i agree with you about the minimum runtime that is happening. there is a lot of skepticism in the united states about the prohibition treaty because none of the nuclear weapons state. they are pretty much all opposing it. none of them have supposed it at a none of the so-called umbrella states that are under the nuclear umbrella have supported it. are you optimistic you should

have despite this opposition. >> i know there seems to be several different approaches in achieving prohibition eliminations. but as one new york his lawyer says, the lawyer called something. he says those differences of emphasis can be worked out. whether it's a nuclear weapons convention were banned treaty, a bit of difference can be worked

out their first prohibit in the use of the nuclear weapons and surely we can achieve it. why not? we should seize this opportunity. the time is now. i have waited 71 years. if we don't seize this opportunity, and i know mr. obama talk about vb this won't happen in my lifetime, defeated once and proud. -- prague. if there is a strong political will, it could have been. it can happen. so yes, i still am hopeful and i believe it can happen because enough people -- not enough for a lot of people are pushing for it and we can get other people joined and keep pushing.

but why not? why don't we communicate our strong feeling to mr. president, even before he leaves the office. we can't afford to wait generations and generations. 71 years is much too long to wait we've wasted. i believe we can and we showed. >> let's take another couple questions. [applause] [inaudible] >> i am cap they rather than with benefactions. mostly i want to say thank you so much for being here and thank

you for all of the work you have done and continue to do. it was phenomenal and amazing that the president went to hiroshima. reality is that this president with the complicity of the entire u.s. president and the congress is aiming at spending a trillion dollars over the next 30 years for the next generation of nuclear weapons. we seem to apply a lot more money for the next generation of nuclear weapons are not so much for the next generation. i wonder if you could just comment on not and how the budget priority are striving and dangerous future.

>> i show you a profound sense of sadness and even anger. if somebody gets the invitation to speak with the president, that's one of the first things that we talk about. [applause] >> that's great. that's great. i don't know what more to say. i just feel very disturbed by that. and yes, when he turns around, he says beautiful things. i was wishing this time hiroshima -- [inaudible]

>> i don't know what more to say. you know, i have been a social worker on my leg. i work in schools and do counseling for the families, learning disabilities of the children. they don't have enough budget to buy necessary supplies. why can't wait to write your taxpayers money to hospitals and schools? instead, $1 trillion is going to produce the weapons. i don't even call up weapons. it is mass murder. somehow we have to ask them to prioritize and responsibilities.

i don't know what else. depriving humanity and security. [inaudible] i'm sorry. maybe my response is not. but i share your opinion. >> thank you, setsuko. i think your response is very appropriate and i think setsuko deserves a good round of applause for bringing us back to reality. [applause] >> once again, thank you so much

for this. it means a lot to me. next time i go to japan i will take you with me and share with the members of survivors organizations. thank you for your support and recognition. >> and thank you, setsuko for joining the esteemed group of arms control. we are very honored to be able to honor you. i also want to thank kathleen sullivan who i fail to introduce earlier had hoped that the presentation. thank you very much. appreciate it. there were several questioners in the audience. setsuko will be around for a while. take a coffee break and the like and get to know her better. but that i will turn the program back over to our esteemed direct tour, darrell campbell.

[applause] >> we are going to take a two or three minute break as we shift between sessions. i would like to ask the panelists for the next session to come forward. we will get started in about three minute. for those of you in the back who are looking for seats, please come forward right now. not later, but now. there is seating in the front. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> if i could ask everyone to come back once again. i'm sorry to interrupt your conversation thank you,

everyone. please find your seat. we will get started in just a couple minutes. those of you looking for seats, there are some empty ones up for for -- up front. [inaudible conversations] thank you, everyone. if you could find your seat, i will start calling out names if you don't get down, richard fieldhouse. wayne class.

[inaudible conversations] thank you, everyone for coming back. i want to thank setsuko thurlow so much for those very moving and important remarks that remind us all while -- why we are here and the work we do to eliminate weapons that can prevent further spread and use of nuclear weapons. it's also a reminder that we have all been at this task for a long, long time. more than seven decades, the united states under republican and democratic administrations alike have very actively

discouraged allies to produce nuclear weapons and for the most part, this effort has been successful and that is why today according to chicago council of foreign relations poll, some 78% of republicans and a 73% of democrats in the 60% of preventing the thread threat to the spread of weapons at the top of a poll. something that i hope the presidential candidates keep in the forefront of their minds that there is some and all americans generally read about. today there are nine states armed with nuclear weapons. five recognized under the non-proliferation treaty for others armed with nuclear weapons outside the nuclear non-proliferation. that is far too many. but with it the addition of the 2015 plan of action, otherwise known as the everyday nuclear deal, we have blocked iran

pathways to the bomb for well over a decade. i would say that there is a very low probability future. the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear buildups are still very much with us. there is some other work yet to be done. to discuss some of the top challenges that we face today, that will test the leadership of the next occupant of the white house, we have four excellent speakers who are going to share their perspective for a different but interrelated nuclear weapons challenge. first we are going to hear from toby dolphin, codirector of the nuclear policy program here at the carnegie endowment for national peace. the nuclear rivals pakistan which continue to expand their own nuclear arsenal. we need to keep in mind that

another cross-border attack with these two states could trigger a nuclear conflict. next we are going to hear from the doctor -- princeton university. he is co-deputy chair of the international panel on fissile materials and the independent commission that looks at the challenges posed by weapons of usable material. he is also a member of our board of directors. he is going to address the significant dangers posed by the nuclear weapons material and the security of those stockpiles, which is a challenge that continues even after the very important series of nuclear security summit that we just concluded earlier this year here in washington d.c. as we all know, north korea continues to pose an enormous nuclear non-proliferation

challenge. joel wit, senior u.s. negotiator with north korea, now would be a two act seis and a 38 north website is going to provide us with his perspective on what can and must be done with respect to prevent the north korean nuclear missile threat. last but not least, we have at this former ambassador susan earp who were share her expect is on the cornerstone of all nuclear non-proliferation efforts and it treaty and we just heard in the previous session is little discussion about one of the more dynamic debate going on surrounding nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the open-ended working group on further measures and to

read more about those developments -- [inaudible] susan has decades of government experience on arms control and non-proliferation issue a special representative of the president from 20,922,012 than in a successful effort at the 2010 non-proliferation treaty review conference that produced an extensive action plan on non-proliferation. so with those introductions, i will go into turn it over to toby dolphin. each of them will speak for several minutes and then we'll take your questions for the panelists. the floor is yours. >> thank you for a match, darrell. it is a pleasure for me to be here. i do not travel very are. one floor down. so i can admire of the arms control association, it is great

to have a chance to be with you today. i should also say that i feel like what i am going to say after the remarks that we heard a few minutes ago seems like a real distraction. it is interesting and important to think about these things in the abstract. we can't divorce them from the reality that these are incredibly dangerous things and it incredibly dangerous places and we need to continue to think about and work on these issues so that nuclear weapons are not used again. i will focus my remarks on what is happening in south asia and what has happened in south asia over the last 20 years and what that means for the next administration. it is remarkable that we just passed now the 18th anniversary of the 1998 nuclear tests by india and pakistan. i feel like it's gone incredibly quickly and a lot has changed as you look at this issue sitting in washington with the priorities we have had a those guys.

first it was trying to make sure immediately following the task you had a conflict and crisis and concerns about a war that could lead to nuclear escalation. we had to a.q. khan network and cereal proliferation and more recently we have had issues of nuclear security and concerns about nuclear terrorism. in the meantime, the successive governments here have been trying to mainstream india into the non-proliferation regime. and still we have these periodic crises between the two states and that issue is the one that can always bring us back to real concern. it is shaping in that region argues for focusing our priorities a little bit more narrowly. i would say as we look at the region, there are periodic

observables in this competition, but the major assumptions we have to make an very significant limitations as we try to assess what is happening there. often times, there are sort of tack by assertion and press releases that seem to be how a new capabilities are announced. those don't necessarily constitute. often times those may be signal intent. they do give a flavor for how the security competition is evolving. we can see now growth in the numbers of nuclear weapons, served in the fissile material stockpiles which i assume we'll talk about in a little bit. diversification of vehicles leading to changes in posture, perhaps even alert level. and command-and-control with them. the development now at short range in the battlefield nuclear

weapons. you see it in indiana and now the development of putting nuclear weapons on submarines that fee. the u.s. is somehow part of china over the last years are part of this picture. in india and pakistan. both pakistan and attacked in a

periodically, which could be the flashpoint for a crisis for the most recent of these was an attack in january on an indian military base or not you did there was cooperation between the two governments to untangle that. they have started to develop more rapid, agile military capabilities to punish pakistan for continuing to tolerate these groups. that has a moderate these provided justification for pakistan to develop adult field nuclear weapons to deter india from doing those things. similarly, you periodically hear from pakistan about the u.s.-india nuclear deal and how that's been a driver of instability in the region. india, china access you have perhaps spill over effects developing a triad and missile

defense and these are long-standing and they don't seem to have an impact on china and it remains unclear. in the meantime, you've also have active chinese assistance to pakistan nuclear energy program, but a history also of assistance to pakistan nuclear weapons program. so what are the implications of this. first, the security competition exacerbates the existing problems primarily in india-pakistan relationship. india has a debate that is sometimes active, sometimes less so about how it should evolve its nuclear thinking to address this changing environment, focused perhaps i'm massive retaliation to punitive retaliation. these are semantics, but they have important implications for how it thinks about nuclear weapons. pakistan seems to be moving towards a riskier posture, certainly from a security and

surety point of view, putting weapons out in the field, devolving them down the chain of command raises significant concerns about nuclear security as well as crisis instability and pressures to choose or lose local commanders. the next administration will inherit the set of problems that previous administrations have not been able to dampen. i think the primary challenges are going to continue to be nuclear security. i would argue from our faith crisis escalation giving that is where there has been a significant chance of a nuclear weapon. certainly the obama administration did a lot on nuclear security and on several occasions has praised the steps pakistan has taken in that regard. i think there are more questions than less focus more questions than less focus that i've been given to india's nuclear security tab and turn. if you look at how it might affect nuclear security, more

weapons, greater numbers of fissile material, more transportation of these things exacerbate the weak links in the security architecture. crisis escalation is a very difficult problem to get in front of. listed the u.s. suffered over the years has been reactive. technology, added materials and capabilities will make future crises likely to speed a come and make it harder to intervene. that is part of the reason they have a higher priority. the trust necessary for cooperation on nuclear security. if you're constantly criticizing another country for their failings or trying to push them

into steps, they are less likely to give you the kind of cooperation or open the facility is or build the kinds of relationships that facilitate better nuclear security practices. on the other hand, how do you thought tendencies that have a natural momentum at this point in terms of the buildup we see it in his capabilities. it's hard to do that in a cooperative way. coercive measures need to have a greater likelihood of success. figuring out how to resolve the tension between those two priorities take significant. that said, i have to say that our policy structure is not really about the government in the administration -- bush administration, obama administration to address the security to resolve the problems that have come between our bilateral ambitions and their beach ball requirements involving these problems. this is a long-standing problem.

as a think about recommendations for the next administration, the first thing i would say it's not necessary to fix the policy structure in a way that allows for inking about this problem in a coherent way. you have a disaggregation of india and pakistan and china responsibility. there is no process that allows for coherent to come to this. as the strategic economic dialogue is happening with china this week, it is important to think about how china's interest in this region are evolving as well. what role does china sea for itself now in south asia? it is? it has made a major investment in pakistan by not in the economic corridor. $40 billion of investment. that exposes risks in ways that it has not been exposed to in south asia appeared with interesting implications, it may

be able to assert a more active role in the future and trying to dampen dampen the tendencies or it may weigh more heavily should there be another crisis of the certain but important to try to press the issue with a broader understanding of china. or, it is important that there is a willingness to be able to speak more openly about the areas where our interests are different and to back that up with both more diverse gestures but cooperative mashers and that includes security. they have a free pass on nuclear security for quite a long time. fourth, they have the best team -- i think what the sequence of events that have unfolded after the january attack by pakistani-based militants in india, you have seen some sort of tentative

steps to try to share intelligence to cooperate in the investigation, and that is something that should be encouraged to the extent possible and institutionalized in ways that would allow the process to stop the crisis or at least arrest them. lastly, an issue near and dear to my heart. there is then an assumption over the last 20 years that has taken hold that had somehow what is happening in an india's nuclear program is more benign than what is happening in pakistan. this is something of a taboo in d.c. it is manifested in the amount ofews coverage given to every missile test and this is a little bit of a dangerous evolution to take place in ways that don't bend been forced us

to talk about the consequences. we find other ways to encourage the region cannot just buy a india, but pakistan. one of the few points we have left is the interest of the state in signing up to the nuclear suppliers and that is an issue that the obama administration has pushed this week. phone calls another state. but i think it would be better to build a consensus-based process on what the criteria should be for membership. they encourage strength in their nuclear areas. what does five suggestions, >> thank you very much, toby.

thank you very much for being here. >> i was asked to talk about the fiscal material problem as part of the non-proliferation challenges for the next president. as i'm sure, all of you know, all of the candidates it's hard to think about how to phrase the remarks in a way that captures for whoever takes charge next. let me start by making an observation about one lesson we can learn from the last eight years and perhaps the last 16 years of non-proliferation policy in the united states. that is if the next president were to be serious about the

fiscal material part, the nuclear weapons material challenge in terms of non-proliferation, we have to get past what is non-proliferation in the headers. and by this, i mean these somewhat grandiose statement that have characterized both the bush administration and the obama administration when they come to talk about fiscal materials. the most obvious elements of this was the suggestion that goes back to the bush administration of what they said was the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material. many, many years have passed an enormous amount of political attention going into this, especially under the obama administration summits that we have seen, the most recent being in washington. one has to be candid that in

terms of the actual fiscal material problem in the world, we are talking not even about the iceberg. we are talking about the snowflake that sits on top of the tip of the iceberg. .. president obama told us what has been achieved. in the six years of the nuclear summit between 2010 and 2016, i quote, we have now removed or secured all the highly enriched uranium from facilities and countries, more than 3.8 tons,

enough to create 150 nuclear weapons. wow. by the best estimate including the one the president mentioned in his speech, this is 0.2%. six years, four summits, 50 presidents and prime ministers and we have addressed .2% of the problem. and that's only if you look at what's being -- as i said secured or eliminated. the countries that are producing material for nuclear weapons in 2010 are still doing it. that's israel, pakistan, india and north korea. all the other nuclear weapons states have stopped long before the process. so we secured .2%. we haven't stopped anybody from

making more and they continue to do it. the second thing that comes from that is that the overwhelming policy choices that have been made specially by the united states have actually pushed things in exactly the opposite direction. it's been about securing mostly material and civilian facilities in nonweapon states which was already in safeguards. the stuff most accounted for and most monitored already. the stuff that should have been the focus of any effort to actually address the material problem is the large share of material that is held by nuclear weapon states and it's unaccounted for and undeclared. largest holders of material in

the world are united states and russia. legacy stockpiles of the cold war. there's been reluctant to address the problem. so the first thing for the next president whoever it is to actually decide that never mind chasing small amounts of kilogram quantities, by themselves couldn't be used to use a nuclear weapon but use with hundreds of quantities that are actually directly under u.s. control or under the control of its direct close ally. then we can worry about other people's materials. so let me give you two things that follow from this, the first is that united states now has enough material set aside for weapons that is twice as lagger

as -- large as the total amount needed, 4,000-plus operational war heads. the united states has material set aside for 10,000 weapons. that's not including the stuff that he's declared and everything else. the first question is why there's a large overhang material which is not going to be used in weapons unless somebody tries to plan somewhere to double the size of the arsenal. in the past the united states has declared material to weapon and military a long time ago. the last time the united states declared highly enriched uranium excess was in 2005. at that time the united states had eight thousand operational.

now it's 4,000 give or take. so the first thing is why not reduce the stockpile of heu set aside for weapons to deflect the reduction at least in the operational nuclear stockpile? associated with that is the fact that when the united states did declare material excess, highly enriched uranium said we are going to dilute this stuff and it has been down blending a couple of tons per year. that's 40 tons left. according to department of energy until 2030 to finish down-blending stuff. the russians were down-blending ten times of the soviet union -- of the united states when they were down-blending their highly enriched uranium. why can't the united states

hurry up and finish down-blending the stuff that's already there? we've already decide it's going to take another 15 years. there's a question of priority. priority is 1 kilogram of highly enriched uranium in jamaica not the 40 tons that are sitting there and could be down-blended. so in material terms and you take responsibility for the material, the focus really has been in the wrong place and perhaps nowhere more so than with plutonium. everybody in this room is familiar with, if it wasn't so tragic it would be hilarious. the multibillion dollar plant that now is never going to be built but consumed enormous amount of political effort and energies being the subject of

countless studies to dispose of 34 tons of plutonium that was declared excess for weapon's purposes. in 2007, we are supposed to have -- grips with plutonium problem. yet, now it looks like it will never go anywhere and the russians are about to begin getting rid of their share of 34 tons. it's process to begin with the united states dealing with 34 tons of plutonium. if we are going to deal with this 34 tons of plutonium that was declared excess, the question is we wait for the process to continue or mark's plan to dilute and dispose whenever it begins or think about what you can do concretely now to show good faith in actually moving this process forward, and there are have been

concrete suggestions. it's not enough to just say that we are going to do some day one day but to say this is actually the highest priority that we have in dealing with materials, dispose of them as quickly as possible and see how that changes the count and the easiest thing to be done is there for those of you who are interested in the red team report on plutonium disposition that came out in 2015 and they said, look, we can either making plutonium into fuel is going to be too expensive, what we can do is strategy of diluting and disposing but the team had interesting suggestion. there's an even faster way of dealing with this problem and that is to sterilize, render them unusable again and this

could be in facility and then prepare them for disposal. but what you've done is irreversibly made them safe. and so one could very quickly and very cheaply begin to show that this plutonium will never go back into weapons in a very quick and speedy way. so you should think about it in those kinds of steps, if the united states was willing to show that it took dealing with the material legacies for seriously, there might be greater prospects of making progress at geneva, the treaty, and of dealing with the material stockpiles of other countries because the largest problem in terms of materials is not the small stockpile held by pakistan and india and north korea or

israel or even china. the real stockpile problems that we face in the world are as i mentioned, the giant stockpiles held during cold war by united states and russia. japan has ten tons of plutonium in japan. much more held in britain and in france. ten tons of plutonium is larger than the stockpile held by some weapon states. if you decide that we are going to go after the largest stockpiles regardless of where they are, one begins to have a different geography of where the problem is and where the attention needs to go and the question is how do we then work with britain and france and japan who are all very close u.s. allies to say between us we have several tons of plutonium, what are we going to do to get rid of this stuff and make sure

that it is disposed of as quickly as possible, the proliferation scenario looks very different. and so i think that the next administration is going to take material perspective in thinking about this rather than the old-school proliferation perspective whether it's countries that we don't like that are a problem, right, regardless of the fact that they have materials that are so small to be insignificant in terms of what we actually have to deal with. just to give you one perspective and then i will stop. when the united states declared its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, this is how much we made and this is how much we have left. there was material that they couldn't account for. it's not lost. they just don't know exactly where it went or if they even made it in the first place because nobody was responsible for keeping accurate accounts always from the beginning. so 3 tons of plutonium that the

united states is unclear and in terms of nuclear weapon's test, also there are several tons of material that was used in nuclear weapon's test. you can always account for reporting, now, these multiple ton quantities pails in comparison to what the russians can account. no one have taken seriously, why don't we account for our federal together, all right. you help us figure out where our stuff went and we help you figure out where your stuff went. at the end of it, it doesn't necessarily expose any national security secrets but at least will start to get a better understanding of the mess we made for the last 13 years in terms of enriched uranium and plutonium. but the amounts that are unclear, unaccounted for is

larger than the stockpile held by pakistan and india and north korea. significant in most cases. you have to ask the question that if you move away from worrying about countries that you don't like of actually dealing with the materials which are the real problem specially if you worry about following falling into the wrong hands, then follow the material and the politics will follow. >> thank you, and there's a course that he teaches about these issues and more. next, we will have joe talk to us about one country that has gotten the attention of presidential candidates. >> thanks for inviting me here today. i have a long association with the arms association and i came

to washington i guess in 1980. it's a great honor to be here to talk to you today. given the limited amount of time i have i am going to make three points. first, north korea's nuclear and missile programs aren't fake. while you're all looking at me like,duh. in fact, up until recently there's been a number of experts and a number of people that think that the danger has been exaggerated and there's been people who think it's just an elaborate by the north koreans to get our attention. i think that idea is not true. it wasn't true before. it's not true now and, in fact, also it was part of u.s. and south korean policies to downplay the threat.

that was part of the policy of strategic patience and was based on the idea, we didn't want to feed north korea's craving for attention and therefore we wouldn't make much of what we are doing. in the last problem, of course, has been the media. i read the media every day, i'm sure most of you don't on north korea and a lot of it focuses on hair style and whether he's overweight and all of the real important issues. in fact, how many of you know that as we are sitting here today north korea probably started another campaign of plutonium at nuclear site. all you need to do is look at the commercial satellite. of course, i'm not saying that we should jump to the other

extreme, we need to do case analysis. given what has been going on particularly the last six months when it's been very visible, at least we put to rest the idea that this is just a -- last year our instate did a year-long study on iran nuclear agreement future. we came up with three different projections going to 2010 -- 2020 and people like david and missile expert, findings basically were that from north korea's nuclear stop pile about 10 to 16 weapons, but it may grow by 2020. 20 weapons which is, of course, 100 weapons and current trajectory maybe about 50 weapons.

they'll also be qualitative improvements. you see the same sort of forward movement. as we all know, it's much more difficult to build effective long-range missiles. we have three scenarios there and the worst case for us, they're moving down the road, which we've seen in parades and we've seen tests of rocket motives. but just putting that aside, i think the one thing we all need to keep in mind that even if north korea never conducted another nuclear test or never conducted another missile test, it can continue to produce nuclear weapons. that's not a problem. it has the facilities to do that. and it already has hundreds of missiles so this is a problem for the region, these missiles can't reach the united states

but it's certainly a problem for south korea and even china. so the bottom line here this is a serious program, it's been steadily advancing for the past eight years, the issue for all of us is how far it would advance and quite frankly it seems to me that the north koreans don't have much incentives to stop. second, what are the implications that current developments continue unabated, there's, of course, a litany of dangers that most of you are familiar with but i will just repeat them here. first, there's not only the growing danger to our allies and our troops in northeast asia but also to the united states itself if north korea moves forward with building. and there's indication to do

that. that's the bedrock of the administration pivot to asia. that bedrock depends on credibility of our security, quite likely will be undermine. link to that, of course, is the danger that to the korea and japan will feel need to build their own. the laundry list of arguments about why that will never happen but we can't be sure in particularly -- we can't be sure, a, in what it may do in the future and now we have the trump factor. maybe it would be a good thing for south korea and japan to build their nuclear.

there's the danger of a growing threat to civility in the region and particularly crisis stability. i guess there's some parallel or northeast asia. the korean peninsula is not the very stable place. quite possible they'll continue into the future. on top of that, well, once again not a lot of attention has been paid to it, there's already an arm's race in the peninsula. we all know what north korea is doing. do we all know what south korea is doing? missile program and also its focus on preventive and preemptive use of those weapons. and finally, there's the danger and we all know that north korea

will export nuclear and missile technology. save said a number of times a nuclear weapon state but, you know, i'm not sure how much that's worth. not worth much of anything particularly if the sanctions continue to grow and impact on north korea and they're forced to find hard turns. third point, i've been asked to lay out what policy options are available to the next president. mitigate this threat. quite frankly as someone who has worked on this issue i would say our options have narrowed significantly in the past eight years. it's clear to me from talking to

north koreans, i meet them regularly in meetings, clear to me that in talking to them since at least 2012 they've got a bounce in their step. they've been building these weapons, no one has been able to stop them, posed sanctions on them, they've done very well even with the limited sanctions we imposed on them and so if i was a north korean, i would be feeling pretty confident. i mean, having said all that, let me lay out five very quick suggestions for guideline in the next administration policy. first, make dealing with this challenge a priority. this may sound change but it hasn't been a priority. it's not a priority even though we talked about rebalancing to asia, the importance of our alliance, nuclear security, and i know there are many meetings

between u.s. and chinese officials. senior-level meetings where north korea barely comes up. it doesn't come up in those meetings, it's not a priority. second point, stop the magical thinking about how to deal with north korea. it's amazing that i still maintain my sanity quite frankly because i hear all sorts of ideas about how we should deal with north korea. and there isn't enough time in this meeting to talk about all of them so i'm not going to do that, but there are a lot of ideas floating around from the administration's policy of strategic patience, to the idea of korea, regime change and korean unification. in my mind, they all qualify as magical thinking. they are unrealistic. third, a related recommendation,

think strategically and not tactically. we are constantly react to go what north korea does and when they do do anything we don't do anything. what are our objectives here? how do we achieve them? what tools should we use? this all my sound very strange but we aren't doing this basic calculation. fourth, be willing to think outside of the box. now everyone is so quick to dismiss any north korea proposal that we are never going to get this process going if we are, indeed, interesting in trying to have negotiations can north korea. once again i don't have time to relay all of those but i will be happy to talk about them. fifth, need to be willing -- whoever the president is should

be willing to take the domestic political risks to secure our national interest as long as there are no security downsides. once again, that may make -- they ma have resonance but the fact that we have been willing to take those political risks, so maybe the fact that donald trump is now said he would meet kim jong un, i'm not sure if that'll give any domestic political coverage but at least a new wrinkle in that area. as far as i'm concerned the domestic political risks are the only downside in approach that combines diplomacy and i will stop there. thank you. >> thank you, joel. we are glad you maintained your sanity till this point. former embassador is going to

talk about the broader set of challenges that face the next u.s. president relating to nuclear treaty as a whole where these issues and others are discussed every five years in a cycle and in between so thank you very much for being here. >> thank you very much for inviting me. i want to thank the arm's patrol association for all the work that they are doing for advocate and advance responsible arm's control. from what we heard so far this meeting, this morning, i feel like i should say my name is susan and i'm a none proliferat tor. having an opportunity to meet with other believers and share the burden. this morning i want to focus on disarmament where the divide between the haves and the have

nots. i will talk about tim pact of the divide and options to address this divide and i really try not to be political but i may not be able to help myself. in any case, you know over the years the parties to the ncp generally have agreed fairly consistently that the treaty has played in grounding and upholding the nonproliferation regime and at the same time frustration over the pace and the process of nuclear disarmament and disagreement over the role of nuclear weapons and npt's strategies. i was involved in the 2010 review conference and that benefited tremendously from the good will that had been generated by the nuclear agenda

layed out by president obama and it was also helped by a substantive decision on the middle east which led the way for consensus agreements on the action plan. there were a number of pieces of that action plan and two things in particular i mentioned, one was that action plan launched an unprecedented process and provided for increased accountability by all states, and those are two important elements. but perhaps expectations were unrealistically high on all sides. we certainly thought that was possible or opening for flood gates. as soon as parties reconvened in 2012, what has become consequences movement began to surge and the first of three international conferences on the

subject was rolled out. now, the nuclear -- npt nuclear state decline today participate in the first meetings, the u.s. and the uk and by doing so in my view they forfeited the opportunity to continue to the developing narrative and they strengthened the hand of the group which we are seeking outside of the framework. now, as support for this movement was growing the prospect of further u.s. russian arm's reduction was fading. north korea as joel has mentioned was continuing tests and engaging in prove -- provocative behavior.

and the open-ended working group which will talk of individual something a nuclear weapons state, the npt states appear to be -- in the documents. i know the u.s. was prepared to report it to know within the

fact that the agreement on the documents, soon after the conference the of signaled its willingness to engage on the basis of the terms agreed by the npt parties and that is the decision. my personal review is up represent on myself, i don't represent the government. i think the decision to establish the award she under different terms than been agreed, that was to go to the u.n. which was voting. made for a missed opportunity. you had a proposal that if we do nuclear weapon state guaranteed and engage in as long as there was consensus. at least a couple process going of discussion in this with the weapons possession. so those to push for a vote i think, question their motives and i heard from some who attended the oewg.

the when and whom i have to say, we were told by some states they didn't want the weapon states to participate. that was one of the motivations. if that's the case i think there's a problem here and it may not be the usual suspects. engagement is a two-way street and requires flexibility on both sides. if one side is setting up a situation that the note of site is not going to be able to live with -- [inaudible] their motivation. in any case the conference has not been scheduled for greece reasons. attracted has become the focal point for debate on disarmament but without the input of weapon states or any other group for that matter because no states possess a nuclear weapon intended to meetings according to the article. but the oewg again without any weapons possessions also discussing the so-called legal

gap. this is what some states argued is the lack of a clear definition of the affected measure -- beat this. to be negotiated rate to nuclear disarmament. there's no consensus on the matter was not that is or is not a legal gap, and i would recommend candidates very well argued rebuttal of the notion of a legal gap in a working paper. it's a good legal analysis to suggest there is not a legal gap and that the treaty is self-sufficient to do whatever you need to do. now, the oewg has gotten some press because several states able to proposal, a handful of states, to convene a conference next year to begin negotiating agreement to revenue about the other a number of other papers

at the table to layout the proposals that we all come to know and understand, building blocks which is step-by-step, a convention come a nuclear weapons convention, a band treat on and these are all proposals in the review context. i would say for many of the participants in these meetings regional and global insecurity is very real. they believe their concerns are legitimate and their frustration with a nuclear weapon states and npt process has led them to this venue. i would also suggest has allied itself to the 22 nuclear posture review with the concerns expressed about the humanitarian impact of nuclear use, and they connected to the goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. these are discussions that have a direct bearing on the future of the npt and i believe united states and the other entity nuclear weapon states should be involved. the challenges facing the npt

regimregime are real in the sene frustration over the pace of nuclear disarmament, theoretical years has contributed to the growth of human turn consequences movement, and it's led well formed to conclude the two sides -- have been more porous than they've ever been. which is alarming. this movement provides an opportunity not only for states to show concern about the dissatisfaction with the status quo but to take matters in their own hands outside of the npt and without the nuclear weapons states as necessary. this is not going to strengthen that treaty. and it will not fill the void that many believe have emerged. bridging the divide is going to require that we make common cause with our partners to address the concerns that fuel the humanitarian consequences movement. i was asked to provide a this case and worst-case, and i won't

get into the issue of politics but who gets elected in november i think we'll very much influenced whether or not there's the best you could make or the worst you can imagine case because the 2010 -- the conference conference is the 50th anniversary, and shortly after 2015, folks already began to look at it as a dramatic milestone omen and every symbolic conference. so no matter what happened i think it's going to be something to watch. even under the best circumstances there's going to be a challenge. so how do you mitigate that challenge? how do you make the best of that situation? an excuse president early on has to reaffirm strong and unequivocal support for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the npt in all aspects. disarmament, nonproliferation,

no spread of nuclear weapons to any countries, and i think that has to be very clear. a prolog like speech that reflected continuity in the nuclear agenda i think we did a lot to reassure international partners about continued leadership, partnership and shared object is. i know there's a lot of criticism about the path agenda painfully realize that i think it's a heck of a good place to start if something like that that builds and moves forward. such an agenda could also include commitments to sustain the work of the international partnership of nuclear disarmament verification of suggest expand its membership to include more non-alliance partners, explore and all the other nongovernmental organizations able to make technical contributions had to make the partnerships work as transferred as possible. these efforts are wages the time available now in the current disarmament mode if you will to

prepare for advancely when the process is then sent to understand and education of white right of states on the verification challenges of lower and lower nuclear numbers. the next president should announce preparation and negotiate an extension to be in place before that agreement expires in 2021. and this would be a way to reengage russia on nonproliferation arms control issues at i did not anyway underestimate the difficulty of doing this. he or she should persevere with the p5 process and be a leader in promoting p5 transparency and accountability for the benefit of the npt. at last year's aca annual meeting, lewis done outlined several possible p5 initiatives to be pursued through this process including p5 actions to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons by anyone as well as the p5 code of nuclear conduct and i would urge people to take another look at those ideas.

if i were advising the next president i would urge that. i think pressure should be kept on getting negotiations going in geneva. i understand that this may be a false airport is important for a number of reasons. and if the u.s. has flexibility as has been reported to be an important element. the next president should uphold the 24 plus year nuclear testing moratorium. and i would suggest ways to signal can keep support for the international monitoring system and a way to make sure that that system is made from that part of the international nonproliferation architecture. the ratification is the issue as we all know you can get into what happens in the other races but i think more effort should be made to make the case to the american people and to congress on why to see tpp is good for

the attorney. i think this is something both the u.s. government, ngos consider this t you either ac is doing a tremendous amount of work, don't underestimate the importance of getting out the word to the american public. and i was a reaffirm u.s. negative security assurance and in the 2010 posture review and we commit the ratification of the protocol think it the other protocols completed. and then in a very theoretical step i would suggest the next president signaled willingness in an appropriate venue to discuss the conditions under which a global negative security assurance agreement is pursued under what condition. what would be the preconditioni know that's a heretic but, finally we should not shy away from joining the ongoing multilateral discussions on disarmament. if we believe that our condition is a sound one which we should

prepared to defend our position. maybe they will learn something, maybe we'll learn something but i think this is signal a clear commitment to both those with weapons and without coming to work with and through multilateral institutions. this should be part of the new president's agenda. while this would not discourage certain states from pursuing solutions outside of the npt, this posh is going to strengthen the hand of u.s. allies. and so you can't fight something with nothing and this is a way to get a real discussion going. even under such a scenario, a successful npt review in 2020 is a 50/50 proposition that is probably generous, since nuclear disarmament is not the only issue that can do real antiquated. but if the goal is to reinforce

the centrality, the indifference to build and irreversibility of the npt, then strong responsible and creative use leadership and engagement and demonstrated with a respectful sense of sensitivity are the real concerns of large number of non-nuclear weapons states -- i am not going to talk about the first tuesday, awarded to press the press but i'll be happy to talk around coffee or antiquated but i would just say in conclusion, a proactive and positive u.s. nonproliferation and arms control agenda is essential for a best case outcome, and to use best case. but it's not a guarantee of such such. and as i've noted bridging the divide i is a two-way street ata non-weapon state and even the ngos must be willing to engage in the search for common ground. i would also note on arms control it takes two to tango and what do i would say this government doesn't have a partner. so it should not be held, to be blamed for not moving forward

without a partner, but maybe what can be done to try to improve a partnership. humanitarian consequences moment is provided a vehicle for non-nuclear weapons states to articulate their concerns and their fears about nuclear weapons which are legitimate. i think we forget they can prevent -- into their frustrations, rightly or wrongly put them at greater risk. the challenges facing the npt regime will require study, informed united states leadership that builds on the decades of work that's already been done. >> thank you. as i said this woul one at the t of the meeting, we have a very substantive and high level program, and i appreciate all the ideas and the problems put on the table but our for speakers on four important areas. and because we have put forward presentation on four different

areas can we ask a question, please be specific as to whom you're directing your question and try to keep a tight. we have about 25 minutes before we're going to take our lunch break, then moved to our keynote speaker at the noon hour. so with that the floor is open for your questions. i see a number of fans going after i will try to get to as many of you as possible. why don't you try to head over to the right side with mr. wolfe by the wall, and then we will take the next one. >> thank you. my name is norman wolf, and i congratulate the panel on an excellent topic. i will confine myself to joel wit. i've always thought strategic patience is not the right term. it should have been different. [laughter]

but toby made an interesting point to make him one of the first things he would recommend into a with south asia is fix the policy structure. i wonder if you think that a problem with existing structure, whether it would be a recommendation you would make in the area to deal with north korea? >> if we take that, why don't we take one more and we will take a couple at a time since we have several. right behind you. >> i am for italy. also a question to joel wit. your presentation is rather pessimistic. but the panorama is rather bleak, i agree with you. but there's one element of hope, and it's an evolution. both russia and china are becoming concerned by the dprk.

and you said that their missile capacity can even reach china and i guess also russia. so maybe also they are fed up with the situation and they can exercise pressure on the dprk. and also what is wrong with the dprk suggestion for negotiation? for negotiating a peace treaty? after all, 60 years have passed from the korean war, and maybe it's time to least establish the border, the most dangerous want is northern limit line, which is not defined at all. thank you. >> thank you. joel? >> thank you for the questions. policy structure, norm has this

experience as i do. this is obviously a very difficult issue to deal with. so the question is can the regular bureaucracy -- [inaudible] so i am norm also been part of an experienced we had one guy in charge who actually drove to a conclusion. the agreed framework in 94. i think today that's what we need again. otherwise leaving this to the state department and the other bureaucracies, nothing is ever going to happen. we will just have more patients. secondly, on your point, first, just come every time i get a presentation people, there's always someone who rightly point out you are being pessimistic. [laughter] yes, you're absolutely right, but i would say maybe it's a

psychological defense. i am being realistic. that's what's important here. yes, we would all like to find elements of hope, but i would suggest that relying on russia and china and some sort of change, particularly in china's approach, isn't going to work. how many times have i had a discussion with people where they say, it looks like china is changing its approach. it's happened over and over and over again, and there may be changes but they are tactics. probably follow the newspapers, you saw president xi was a former north korean foreign minister is now a member of the politburo the other day, at a lot of people are interpreting that as china accepting north korea as a nuclear weapons state.

so i don't see that as an element of hope. third come under north korean suggestion, let's negotiate a peace treaty, i agree. idols to anything wrong with that, as long as we get our issues on the table. the problem is actually very difficult for americans and people in northeast asia to visualize, because a peace treaty in theory could lead us to a very different northeast asia, a very different korean peninsula. i do know the impact would be on our alliances in northeast asia, if there was forward progress. so it's very hard for people to make that leap. but i would argue him as i said in my presentation, think out of the box, the only way we are going to deal with this problem is by addressing poor security

concerns on both sides. and i've been in meetings where people say, the north koreans, they don't have anything to for from the united states. why do they think we are at a security threat? you know, i mean, you don't have to meet with north koreans regularly to see what's wrong with that statement. so that's what has to be done. >> before we move onto some questions for the other panelists on other issues, if you could just quickly remind us no matter how difficult this is, what are the stakes? and you institute has done some careful research on some future smears in terms of what the north koreans may have in their arsenal years down the road. spewing do you mean the implications of? >> i mean by 2020, by the end of this next president's first term. i mean, how many nuclear weapons might north koreans have at their disposal, what might some

of their capabilities be based upon some of the research that your team has done? just to remind people what's at stake. >> i think, as i said earlier, we did three different scenarios, i should say david albright, did three sinners to the range of weapons was from 20-100. that doesn't sound like a lot to us in the united states but it sure sounds like a lot to the south koreans and the japanese. and, of course, the qualitative improvements are almost as important. it's unclear. i think, david things, and now the u.s. government thinks, and the south koreans are admitting that the north koreans can put a warning on top of at least a regional range missile. so they've made qualitative improvements, it depended on the pace of nuclear testing, they

could make a lot more, including the possibility of developing a very simple single stage hydrogen bomb by 2020. so the nuclear side of things, that's pretty much what we saw. on the missile side, once again, complicated, more complicated then the nuclear side. big development out of their, the elephant sitting in the corner of the room is whether they can build an icbm. we have seen it. we've seen lockups -- mockups on in the rates. we've seen a test of the rocket engine motors. you know, what's next wax we may see more tests. we may even see a test of the weapon itself. these are all things that should not be taking people by surprise, and are coming down the pipe. >> we've got some other

questions here. why don't you come to the front table and take this. thanks. >> hello. my name is angela and i question is for zia. mitogen is that pakistan would not participate in active negotiations because of its strategic concerns. my question is a bit of a technical wonder i was hoping you could talk about estimates for the size of pakistan and india's stockpiles, and at current rates of production. how long it would take pakistan to catch up with india under the scenario that that would be the critical juncture which they could join npt negotiations? thank you. >> why don't we take one more question here in the middle.

>> i've probably been in the business may be to want but there's something called united nations disarmament commission which meets annually. its primary objective -- [inaudible] consider all aspects of nuclear disarmament. by definition to all u.n. members are there, which means all of the states both in and out of the npt. united states participates but i don't say it would give very much attention to the. what are the prospects that the u.n. d.c. could sort of become a more central point of dealing with nuclear disarmament involving all of the processing states and all of the other states and perhaps the oed of we she efforts -- oewg efforts could morph over into that forum which is ready to continue

working indefinitely, perhaps as a beginning point for picking that up. bearing in mind russia has made it clear at least that the undc that they are not prepared to more bilateral negotiations. >> thank you for that. out international panel of fissile material's does these estimates on a regular basis and you can find the most recent ones most recent global fissile material report. i think the most interesting thing is that the current balance of materials. the question is the presumption behind your question and claims that pakistan makes that is delaying and blocking beginning of talks at the conference on fissile material cutoff treaty because of india's larger

nuclear stockpile. it's true, they have made an enormous investment in building up the production capacity, especially for plutonium, weapons plutonium, in the last 15 years. as about 2000-2001 it had one plutonium reduction factor. now is for the property. i think the thing afghanistan is there is not that much difference in the stockpiles of material produced for weapons purposes between the two countries. what pakistan points to is india's largest stockpile of unsafe code of plutonium that is from indian nuclear power reactors, which india says was made and will be used for fuel for its breeder reactor program. so putting on the table and didn't stop of which is outside safeguards but which india tens if not for weapons purposes.

there is the concern behind this and that is that india's fast breeder reactor to use plutonium as fuel but it can produce weapons grade platoon as a byproduct of its operation. so it will be a lottery that will take reactor grade platoon as fuel and produce weapons grade plutonium as a byproduct. that's what we are afraid of down the road. and it's a legitimate fear because that reactor which is already six years late, if it operates as any reasonable rate which is uncertain because most people who have tried breeder reactors have realized they are hard and unstable, have lots of problems that lots of problems educated and operate well. but that breeder reactor in the works could increase india's weapons plutonium production rate almost tenfold. the sad part, of course to visit the united states has had 15

years to deal with the pakistani concerns and the indian breeder reactor program, and has refused to take a aspects recently because of other interests. since 9/11 the united states has been were interested in chasing al-qaeda and killing taliban that dealing with pakistan building up its weapons program and has been more interest in recruiting india to its side in the emerging cold war with china and have access to the indian market and all these other things. so we won't talk too much about what he is doing with its nuclear program as toby mentioned earlier on. the real reason i think that pakistan's blocking is because again. and is using that time to build up its arsenal to whatever size it thinks it is appropriate really regardless of how big india's stockpile is or isn't. and it's largely, you know. spent why don't we go to the question with the undc?

>> i don't really no, i do not answer to that question. i see randy rydell, he might know better but i'm not aware of the undc producing anything in recent memory. and i remember years ago probably when i was at the pentagon where it was the more common doing stuff but i'm not aware that it is being used by any state to do anything meaningful. the other thing, pennsylvania, if it's under u.n. rule where you can vote things in or out, if it's consensus, i just don't know. my impression of it is that it has not been particularly active or in the front lines or even in the middle line, maybe not even in the rear line for a long time would require a retelling. i just don't know the answer to that. >> before we go to the next question that they just ask a follow-up of toby and zia on the

treaty issue at the end of your response, try to come you said pakistan was blocking the start of negotiations because they could, because the conference on disarmament operates according to the consensus rule that one country can block. just january as we reported in arms control today, the u.s. put forward a proposal that would meet one of pakistan's concerns which is to discuss the stockpiles as part of the negotiations. pakistan is to oppose. then went prime minister trudeau it came to washington and met with president obama there was a very small notice line that it issued in a statement that the rest of the approaches to pursue its fissile material cutoff treaty other than conference might need to be explored. ..

just in the way that susan mentioned, the nuclear weapons states when they want to protect their interest, like when we talk about nuclear disarmament, the other nuclear weapons do want to be involved in a cutoff treaty, the russians, chinese, others may say the u.s. may be fine with all this allies, but we will vote for whatever it is. we want consensus in any process. you can get a process, but a wealthy than other weapons

protect their own interest in a negotiation of one consensus also appeared whether that helps us go that much further forward, given the differences that they have in their negotiating institutions. i think the real issue is not to go outside the fiscal material negotiations in geneva. the question you have to ask is whether the country is dependent on the international system has packaged in good is able to withstand the entire international community. the only reason it doesn't is because no one cares enough to call them on it. and they get in the way we the way with it, precisely for that reason. everybody else has even more important interest to pakistan. the day that begins to change, the pakistani position will begin to change. you have to remember we been here once before. in 1998 pakistanis that we have

enough material. we can have negotiations of fiscal material. that was 1998 because they thought the world was really concerned with that kind of determination that will let the process go forward. doesn't mean they will agree. this is the question of how bad the international community wants this treaty. >> i would not much of that other than to reinforce what zia suggested that within the p5, there's a range of views, let alone an smt. so the risk outside the cd is we might time at the site quickly becomes a much smaller number of state. >> i see a couple more hands.

i want to respect the people in the rear of the room. if you could get to her. we will take one more up front and then we were about at our lunch break. >> from voice of america persian tv network, i know this -- because of china's interest investment in pakistan in recent trade who operation between india and iran, do you see any possibility of nuclear cooperation between india and iran and how can the future united states strike a balance with regard to china and india ally of the united states and the pakistan and india -- [inaudible] >> let's take one more question as we consider that one. right here, please.

>> benjamin to a retired foreign service officer. israel seems to be opening up a little bit on its nuclear weapons program. how do you see this evolution moving ahead in the next few years? there was mention, susan burke mentioned a nuclear weapon free zone. >> thank you. the first question that was fast and will turn to the second. >> as i understand that, the question was how should china and india and iran, how does that all look particularly its nuclear trade is concern going forward and whether there is potential for some stabilizing role player. i think the questions about

iran, as sterile highlighted have focused much more on the closing down of the weapons infrastructure. what we see still is interest in nuclear energy they are. russia has been the primary recipient of that interest and i would imagine with continued to be the primary recipient of that interest. india has been in reactors, but largely has participated much in the international nuclear trade. it is quite a ways from being able to do that. the big question is the extent to which china is becoming more of a supplier. what that means in terms of the international market and the roles associated with that. and somehow, it has been primarily building reactors in pakistan, but has participated in a number of bids to build reactors outside of pakistan. so it is conceivable in the

future could play a much larger role in the nuclear power programs of others stayed. that leads to the questions about whether china has the same priorities in terms of safety, security, responsible crack essays. that is not something we should take for granted. but there's not a lot of evidence at this point to suggest they don't. that strikes me as an area for important conversations and cooperation going forward. >> suzanne, do you want to take the question about israel's interest stories role in reducing the risks, especially through the wmd free zone in the middle east. >> i haven't been involved in the middle east discussions. israel is not a party to the npt. the middle east issue as i mention have been a sensitive issue at the npt review conference since 95 or even

prior to that it was always some subset about the middle east, iran, iraq that would keep people in the conference room until 3:00 in the morning. i'm not going to comment on whether they are opening up or not, but there were valiant efforts made after the 2010 conference to try to contain a conference of regional states to discuss establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone. that is the proposal, not just nuclear, but i weapons of mass destruction. in the end, from reporting the israelis were participating in the meeting and there where the arabs that were not reaching out to israel and not participating. so the conditions just tell the right they are. it is not israel that is the problem as best i can tell in terms of getting together with regional partners and the

parameters of a conference. it is safe to say that the obstacle has been the larger group that state. i won't go any further than that. >> i would just status is like the middle east region, which is what i covered in this session, you know, we be arms control association have been talking about and continue to discuss ways in which we can build upon the way the iran deal to head off possible future iranian interest beyond the terms of that agreement as well as looking for ways in which other countries including israel can join in some of the multilateral measures the comprehensive nuclear test treaties, which was fine, but not ratified. there are ways in which other countries can help reduce nuclear risks and create the conditions for the wmd free zone beginning of a nuclear weapons test free zone. that will be a subject of focus

for the control association at future events. we are at a scheduled time for this session. i hope you found this conversation rich. it may be unsatisfying. it may be a little difficult to take sometimes. these issues keep coming at us. but that is why we do our work. i want to just note before we thank our panelists that we are now going to be breaking for about 20 minutes for lunch. i would encourage all of you to step outside with some alacrity to take your plate of food. there will be two lines. we are going to resume the program close to 12:00 noon as possible for a keynote speaker. then rose. with that, we will take a short break. please join me in thanking all of our panelists. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> and a lunch break now from this daylong event looking at national security policy hosted by the arabs control association. when they returned from a keynote address from white house deputy national security adviser ben rhodes. until then, looking at e-mail privacy. >> this week on "the communicators," a discussion about the electronic communications privacy act. mimi cooley on is that the american civil duties union. what is the electronic communications privacy act? ebta is about bringing into the digital age. in today's world, the average american expects the e-mail they sent is going to have the same

protection as the love letters they may have put in. unfortunately, laws that govern when police ask that have not been updated since 1986. in the interim, court says that police have to get a warrant before they get things like e-mails or private facebook messages. this would essentially put that protection into the law. that is consistent with the policy adopted by the fbi. it is similar to what google, microsoft and others already require. it puts the requirement into the law, eliminating any ambiguity about protection that apply to people's private sensitive digital information. >> host: but if the legislative status of an update? >> guest: right now the house has passed the bill 419 to zero. it's been supported by republicans. >> host: what does that bill do? >> guest: it was put in place

to basically set in a time that police want to get your e-mail, other types of digital content, they have to come to providers with a warrant. in fact, it is backed by a right-wing group, left-wing group, companies. bright now the bill is sitting in the senate and we are waiting to move in its path and become law. >> host: why is it that in the senate? >> guest: right now is slated to be taken up by the senate judiciary committee next week. there have been a host of amendments proposed in many of these men start unnecessary. many are controversial. the hope is to build those cleanly given the broad base of support not only in the house, but the public at-large to very much want to feel their rights are protected in the digital age. >> host: also joining us is trained and experienced bryan porter of the commonwealth attorney or state attorney and the commonwealth of virginia.

mr. porter, what do you think about the legislative efforts to update the electronic communications is? >> guest: interestingly enough, i don't think we are too far apart from the position stated a few minutes ago. in virginia but they make sure warrants are attained, and the communications. over the course of my 15 years as a prosecutor, on a number of occasions they obtained e-mails, but every single time we as a search warrant in an effort to obtain that. what is important is that what needs to happen is ecpa, when it amended the ticket the same protection to someone's love letter as they would also have a love letter but electronically. not additional protections. from the investigative field, that is really what our main fairness, to make sure the

electronic communications are provided with the same level of protection, not an expert level of protection beyond which you would expect in your home. >> host: what is the legislative effort to add extra layer as you call it? s. got one of the things that concerns us in the position before the senate is it does not allow for the traditional exceptions to the search warrant requirement often used by law enforcement for instance in a critical missing case where someone's actual personal safety. in other words, very limited circumstances that he police officer or federal agent might be able to access somebody's written document, access their home and car without a search warrant in an emergency situation. our position is currently written and contemplated by ecpa. it's one of our main areas of concern. one other area in the investigative field in investigative field and the law enforcement arena is the fact

that there really isn't any industrywide standards for providers. i can tell you from personal experience it's a much different. dealing with facebook for example than google in relation to the amount of information we get back, the rapidity in which it's actually given to us and the obstacles we face dealing with these different providers. one of the things we would also like to see is that ecpa when it is amended and enacted would give us some kind of standards for the providers to follow so we have some determination when the information is good to be given to us in what circumstances. >> host: before we introduce our guest reporter, neema singh guliani, what did you hear from mr. porter? >> guest: the issues raised are addressed in the legislation. it's not providing more protection to your e-mail. if providing the equivalent protection that the constitution requires you in response, the concerns about emergencies. right now the existing and are

they can go and needed information. providers routinely respond to requests. many providers have a team on call 24 hours a day to respond to those requests. the legislation that's pending preserves the existing infrastructure and importantly it does benefit and we heard that it's important, which sets the standards for what all providers must follow. import you qualify as it is the right process. it is the right vendor that must be met. it's really a step forward in terms of creating players tenders that companies can file a deadline person and prosecutors can accept. >> i guess we had some disagreement about exactly what contemplated by ecpa. going through an amendment process, the end result might address our concerns. these are areas where is law enforcement officers we are seen

as being resistant to the idea of having warrants for this information. i don't think that's accurate from his point. i've been very forward again. the nba has been forward again in accepting almost every circuit and a warrant based on probable cause and the evidence found in the electronic records is the way to go. this is a huge change from a very complicated bill and we are asking that the syndicate due diligence then go through and understand civil liberties, but also the argument of law enforcement. we at the state level investigate crimes. we use the information from these types of records and combating otc drug trafficking organizations, human trafficking organizations. i do not couple times in the city of alexandria over the past couple years and in homicide as well. you do have real serious concerns here about the level of crime in a pf human being at

issue the want to make sure those concerns are adequately addressed by the amended legislation. >> host: join in our legislation is amir nasr of the morning counsel. he covers technology for the publication. >> the question that your answer kind of brought to mind. and the senate now come the judiciary committee postponed their vote last week to address some concerns that as many, senator john corning had proposed a couple of amendments. one of them was to help counterterrorism operations than the other is dealing with emergency situations. jurist or both of you wet your thought i must amendments for you, whether they fix the legislation, whether that undermines that. >> guest: i have to see the final version to accurately answer your question. all we are asking if the amendment finally adopted just basically incompetence the

current exceptions to the search warrant requirement and basically codified that in ecpa. i'm talking about your emergency situation in which a person with alzheimer's is missing and police need to locate this person immediately because they might be in physical danger and we don't want anyone to be harmed to get a search warrant from a magistrate. talking about that, underage people who might be a harm or risk of harm in talking about the need to find seriously dangerous felons in a short period of time that we have basic information about where they might be. >> host: i think you raise some great points. the first question to ask is on a bill that passed 400 teen-0, why are we talking about additional amendments whether such a broad-based report? but the amendment that senator corning raised, they both raised

privacy concerns. one of them would dramatically expand the surveillance authority of the fbi and allow them to without a quarter or get information about individuals, what websites you visit, what they might click on, information about what they may send. location information that might be associated with someone's ip address. the average american would be concerned to that end that the fbi could get the nation without going to court, particularly given the history with these types of subpoenas. for example, the inspector general has noted that these national security letters have been abused in the past and have been used for circumstances. given the controversy, given the concern, this is not the bill to put the amendment on and i'm confident none of the congress will say this is a problem.

would it require that providers, companies like google and microsoft respond to emergency request in cases where they thought no emergency existed. even if they had evidence that a law enforcement official was trying to abuse this type of exception. what we've seen in the past is removing the ability of providers to resist as improper is a real problem because there has been abuse of these exceptions in the past. for example, 2010 department of justice inspector general examine use of the so-called emergent exceptions of national security content. they found there had been abuse. derek cases where requests are put in an circumstances that truly accident. it's a problem when you are removing the protection those types of requests and on top of that there are no protections to ensure if there is abuse, the information as it is in the civil case, but someone has the

ability to say no emergency existed in iraq have been violated. >> bar in the civil liberties can turn, is a concern for attacking privacy advocates that senator corning is obvious a very powerful, but also a cosponsor. does that make advocates we are a going forward to a potential committee or full senate vote on the underlying bill? >> senator corning is a cosponsor of the legislation. i'm confident a password access. i think these amendments put forward are concerning. i think that the senator and other members have heard those can earn and go back to the house though. it's a no-brainer to take it up and pass. it's rare that you see a piece of legislation that is such a broad race of support of individuals and groups across the spectrum for which industry

also say it desperately needed support. >> mr. porter, the house though she's talking about under when a few changes in committee that many privacy advocates were okay with it moving forward. they take out a notification requirement. congress' subpoena powers were maintained. i am curious for my enforcement standpoint, how do you feel about that bill that in passing, was that it was sufficient? >> i think it's a very good question. i think again, law enforcement perspective is the law that surrounds the electronic records, by the way, almost every major investigation in today's age can utilize electronic evidence as part of the investigation. those types of entities, providers that maintain and

collect this type of electronic evidence needs to be said that to the same rules as the banking industry or a storage facility that has physical objects of evidence. in other words, there shouldn't be additional evidence for this particular class. that's very difficult because in most cases when you're talking about physical objects, here we have the intervening layer of having providers involved in it. for instance, the point that was made a few minutes ago about having providers and given the opportunities to basically reject the issue for records is difficult from a law enforcement respect to because these providers have business concerns at their heart. they are not worried about whether the investigation will go well or whether it's even a serious criminal might be prosecuted but the evidence.

they are worried about telling their product and making sure the client base is happy with protections. it is good business to be seen fighting the good fight if he will. it's a real problem for us. with regards to the notification requirement, that is far beyond any other search warrant. the search were for somebody's resident, somebody's fault. the safety deposit box. there is no notification requirement at that point. in most cases a search warrant at public record. the defense attorney will be provided a copy of the search warrant. the idea that we might have to tell a child or nonpreferred or human trafficker or a member of ms-13, a criminal street gang that is a chilling effect. those are our concerns about bill. i'm glad they were addressed. >> host: the fourth amendment to the constitution reads the right of the people to be secure in persons, papers and effects against unreasonable searches

and teachers shall not be violated in the warrant shall issue but upon probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons to be seized to electronic communications, mr. porter. >> guest: i absolutely agree that it should get a couple points about the fourth amendment. first of all it limited in what it actually said. a search must be reasonable. that doesn't mean every search ever connected has to be done to what we want. that's not what the text of the amendment says. searches must be reasonable or alternatively not unreasonable. in some circumstances come emergency situations we talked about earlier with a critically missing endangered person or perhaps a dangerous felon who needs to be caught before they do any more harm, in those types of emergency circumstances, it is reasonable to conduct a search without a warrant. so i agree with my counterpart

here in almost all circumstances and the vast majority when we have the ability to resort to the legal process, that's the way it should be done. a reasonable search and some circumstances can be done warrant listing in emergency situations. that the law for a safety deposit box in somebody's home and we would argue also the same exact standard for electronic communication. >> this isn't in the bill, but the right to be notified when the government is requesting information is a cornerstone of the fourth amendment. what that means is you can go to court and return information. you can check government surveillance or government searches that are unlawful and improper and historically as a practical matter, when you have the above letter stored in your desk, you know when police went to get the letter because they have to enter your property and request permission to come into your house or force their way into the house.

the fact that the bill doesn't include a notification requirement doesn't require police to notify you either immediately or delayed if that might jeopardize an investigation means as a practical matter if oldies have a decades worth of e-mail never charged with a crime, you may never know so you can get appropriate. that is a huge problem. it's not in this bill, but that is something congress will deal with in the future and not as a protection critical and should be included in legislation. >> on the notification, it's interesting because you have microsoft suing the u.s. government for their frequent use of gag orders kind of barring none for notifying individuals when their e-mail messages had been seized. they are only one of many tech companies that have gotten involved a trade group said it had we want to change this.

i do think that contributes to the whole discussion considering nike said earlier they are the gatekeepers of the information. >> it goes back to my earlier point. the providers see it through the prism of wanted to make customers happy, encrypting as part of that discussion. good security for accounts obviously very important people. i don't think there's anything wrong with that. the unusual circumstance for so much relevant information in the hands of the third-party. we have been more focused thinking. there's a clear argument to be made when people give information to a third party provider. i'm not making the argument because i agree belongings changed as communication changes over the years.

it is brought up on your hobby above letter, the police come in menu with how they've taken above letter. that's not necessarily true. the police got it when you weren't looking. the work for a safety deposit anywhere else there is no notification requirement. obviously they're going to get a copy and have the ability to fight that afford. if you're talking about hypothetically, and sometimes it can take a year, 18 months to get the investigation all the way through if the permissions are notification had gone through, i soon search warrant is obtained, the six months or whatever starts to take immediately. at the end of six months we've got to notify the person that the evidence will be destroyed. is a real concern is what we are

asking for is the same type of protections in people's homes, other objects, other effects. >> if i could respond to one of those points are that this issue raised as well, won't interfere with law enforcement to do their job. what say they have an investigation like was just mentioned. the provisions in the bill would've allowed law enforcement to go to court and say look, notifying individuals at this point would jeopardize the investigation. would like to provide delayed notice in the company to notify the customer can delay notification on the part of the government. those orders can be renewed. that notification would be provided in the investigation would have no concern about tampering with the evidence. the existing notification provision allows the government to meet obligations to provide notice. the obligation has historically

been something law-enforcement could not or did their duty. but it also accommodates law enforcement needs and ensures that doesn't interfere with the ability to conduct a complicated investigation. >> well, my understanding was at some point the bill with the ability to delay notification for six months. if there's a conversation to be had about the ability maintaining the secrecy of the investigation could be updated on a periodic basis. the conversation we might be willing to have. that is not required of any other type of search. i find a search warrant and i can execute a search warrant without knowing we've invaded their home and on the search inside of the home, there is no notification requirement in the code that makes us have any obligation to call the person

and tell them we have a search warrant. i would also point out notification provisions and also having the right to refuse process because they don't think a true emergency exists. those are protections that can be given an abuse by providers. we are very concerned about those. >> as we are having this conversation, the bill is going through congress. there's also been revelation the senate intelligence authorization bill has a provision where it allows the fbi to read e-mails without necessarily obtaining a warrant. i am interested because they are literally simultaneously going through the senate. how do you think this conversation advances moving forward? it shows it is not over just

this one bill. the policy conversation is clearly evolving all the time. how do you think regardless of what happens with this bill, this whole conversation, how does it move forward? >> the larger question of how does congress have to gloss to ensure the people's information is now that we have the communication is very much a beginning. we saw the senate intel authorization bill in a closed markup session where they have access is very concerning. what we've heard, we haven't seen that legislation that that it would allow the fbi to get very sensitive and her mission without going to a court. the average american would be concerned if a government knew what websites they visited, whether they went to websites to get assistance with a health disorder, whether they googled the number, a suicide hotline,

whether they sought help for domestic violence or a medical condition and americans increasingly finding her mission sent that and expect it will be treated with historical information, once kept in a duster. the concerns you heard it said on the intelligence committee, the concerns you heard what the public at-large will continue and our strong indication that those are areas where we need to have more protections, not less. >> i think it's a very good question. the first thing i would tell you is i'm very pleased to see congress taking this debating. first of all, the legislature needs to take hold of the situation, update ecpa and i'll give you a couple reasons.

for instance, on a regular basis, we request records from google, facebook, twitter and that requires us all the way -- >> we're back live at a daylong form a national security policy hosted by the arms control association. you can watch the rest of "the communicators" at 8:00 you're on c-span2 on c-span2 online anytime at c-span.org. -- we have an overflow room in the back at carnegie endowment for peacebuilding. we have the honor and privilege for a second keynote address someone who has been involved in the articulation implementation of president barack obama strategy to address threats posed by nuclear weapons. the deputy national security

adviser for strategic communications, benjamin rose. then as a longtime key member of president obama's national security team. from the period preceding president obama's april 5, 2009 speech on his vision regarding the steps towards the peace and security without nuclear weapons to president barack obama is it 10 days ago to hear a shame that peace park where he recognized and reflected on the tremendous suffering of that war and the meaning of the atomic awning of hiroshima and nagasaki, which we heard about this morning. we have asked them to come here today about seven years after the prague address to review and reflect on what the president has accomplished over the past several years. a lot has been accomplished. we've asked them to talk about why that is important for the

world for u.s. security and perhaps wetmore the president believes needs to be accomplished. as the president said in his eloquent remarks in a hiroshima, quote, persistent efforts can rollback the possibility of catastrophe. we lead to the destruction of stockpiles to new nations and security of the materials from fanatics. as i said, thanks to president obama's leadership efforts come a great deal has been accomplished, but even as he has acknowledged, there is much more needs to be done. on behalf of our arms control association members here today, and many others out there concerned about these issues, and let me say we hope the president can and will use the power of his office in the months remaining to inspire the

message to advance further commonsense steps that would move us closer to a world without nuclear weapons. we thank you for being with us here today, taking time out of your busy schedule and we appreciate their personal contributions to these issues and look forward to your remarks. these come up to the podium. afterwards, we will take questions from reporters who are here and then we are going to take questions from the general audience on three by five cards on your table and the staff will come collect them and get to as many as possible. thanks for being here. >> thank you, and darrell for inviting me here today. anyone who's worked on arms controls and government which include people in this room used to receiving the occasional password e-mail from darrell,

playing out exactly what we should be doing. i thought the association could save time by publishing collective e-mails every quarter as the roadmap for the u.s. government. i want to thank you sincerely naca and the other group for your tireless advocacy on these issues. as i said in i'll come back to this in my remarks, but when you go, it gives you a greater appreciation for the fans of work done by the arms control association and many others. i want to begin with a quick story about a different time and a very different presidential campaign from the current one. nine years ago in 2007 i recently left the wilson center for a job as a speechwriter. if you can believe it, some people were young and experienced back then and i had a lot more hair.

that's a problem with these events. everybody i know looks the same and i always feel i look a lot older. that summer and fall, a key issue in the campaign was the iraq war and senator obama's opposition to it in the beginning. october 2nd, 2007 the campaign is gearing up to mark the five-year anniversary of his speech obama gave opposing the iraq war was undetermined costs and consequences. instead of giving a speech about iraq, senator obama has to prepare a speech about the need to pursue a different foreign policy course and the centerpiece of that speech was a call for the united states to nuclear weapons than engage in direct pharmacy with iran over its nuclear program. we even had ted sorensen introduced senator obama as a tribute to president kennedy's historic speech at american university: united states to rethink our approach in the cold war. that was the first of many

efforts we made to file or path that was late in that american university speech. as we enter the home stretch of the obama presidency, it is worth remembering he came into office with a personal commitment to pursuing diplomacy in taking arms control seriously. the first major speech he gave as president focused on these issues, putting more meat on the bones of what he talked about as a candidate. this focus was rooted in concerns about the status quo in 2009. north korea conducted a nuclear test advancing its nuclear program. america's own commitment to arms control has been called into question for a variety of reasons including the withdraw from the afghan treaty and nuclear guidance under the bush administration nuclear security efforts lagging behind other counterterrorism policies. the central objective of the prague speech was the non-proliferation nuclear security and diplomacy back

where they belong, which is at the center of american national security policy is. we have a reminder of the importance of the effort when north korea tested a missile. that was the first time i had to make the president of the united states in the middle of the night after he'd been woken up and he was in a sparse attempt in a hotel in prague. not exactly the glamour when dreams about, but help drive home for us before that speech the seriousness of these issues. today i would like to revisit the prague speech in the prague agenda, what we said we would do in that speech, what we've done and what we haven't done. i'll be straightforward upfront. i know the work is incomplete. i've read enough of your e-mails to know that there are areas where many people in this room would like us to do more and i'll get to that. i'm glad that is the case. as i said, having been to hiroshima, i would like there to be more people consistently pressing for bolder action on these issues.

i do think president obama has that been followed a course that has profoundly changed the status quo. one of the overarching objectives of the prague speech was to create a sense of urgency. as the president said, more nations have acquired weapons. terrorists are determined to buy, build and our efforts to contain the regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold. all of these threats require effort and coordination with one another of them are just taking individual pieces, but trying to look at the issue broadly. and again, let me review the three broad objectives the president said in prague. what we've done and what we were made to do in our terms of and hope in the future. we believe we have made substantial progress in securing

vulnerable nuclear materials around the world. the most urgent danger we face today in the materials to make one. that is why the nuclear security summit process issue should be allocated within our own system, with another government than on the international agenda. since that first summit in washington, 3.8 tons have been removed with more than 50 facilities. and not material for 150 nuclear weapons. it is completely disposed of their highly enriched uranium. south america is free of nuclear materials and when poland and indonesia will be true of central europe and southeast asia. these are not always headline grabbing offense, but one company was ukraine and it certainly contributes to global security with a mix of conflict and russian backed separatism does not include access to nuclear material.

at the same time, we strengthen international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling. they are now more than 100 nations in the initiative and we've been able to work with many countries and raise concerns. we have installed 300 international border crossings, airports and ports an additional 102 nations have joined the amendment to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material which allowed it to come in may for the day share. there's a lot more work to be done on the issues which i'll get to in a few minutes. we strengthen institutions and hope we have developed habits of cooperation that will outlive the administration in ways that make the world safe. second, the president has taken to absurd his vision of peace and security in the world without nuclear weapons. to reduce america's own security strategy, we revise our strategy to make sure we would not use

nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nation in compliance with npt. the main policy to pursue objective of making deterrence against the attack. in our contingency planning to help avoid catastrophic misjudgment. the central numerical limits of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty which must be met at february 2018 with u.s. and russian deployed weapons and delivery systems. the treaty includes the comprehensive regime. and precisely at times other tensions between the united states and russia would be grateful for the agreements with the verification embedded in new start. there are 4500 nuclear weapons in our stock pile. 85% in the cold war and the lowest it's been in several decades. we further determine we can sustain i deployed nuclear weapons by an additional third.

grieve not for bolder ambition with respect to reductions but we have continued to step-by-step pursue a world without nuclear weapons and in doing so fulfill their commitments under the npt. this leads me to the third objective laid out in prague which was fortifying the global non-proliferation regime. in prague the president put forward several principles. president obama said we needed more resources and authority to strengthen international inspection and the united states is providing more funding for the iea, investing in nuclear security fund from a capacity of and peaceful use initiative at the 2010th npt review conference. president obama said we should build framework for civil nuclear cooperation including international feel bank or countries can access peaceful power without risk of proliferation. since then, we reach new agreements on cooperation with other countries, most recently vietnam and was supported the iaea in kazakhstan in their effort to open a feel bank that

concern the supply of last resort for countries that cannot obtain the global commercial market pineda fueled reactors. president obama said we need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules are trying to leave the treaty without cause. since then he's dedicated an enormous amount of time and effort to follow it through the principal. much of the work we did at the outset has set the context for the capacity to hold the country like iran accountable for meeting its npt commitments. we have affirmed their commitment to their npt obligations for the news or obligations. the u.n. security council resolution in a session chaired by the president in 2009. president obama said in prague will support iran's right to nuclear energy with rigorous inspections and demonstrate a willingness to pursue diplomacy with iran. before seeking international sanctions we present clear evidence of the international

norm poster magically develop in a covert facility. all of the effort the loudest and make the case to other nations in the u.n. but imposing consequences on a rant is not simply a national security interest of the united states. this was in a bilateral issue cover bilateral concern or a regional one, but rather essential to the npt and rules-based international order that there be consequences for violations of the npt. the president also made clear sanctions were not an end. they were a means to an end to strengthen our diplomacy with iran. we have numerous false starts the following deterioration of the economy in large part because of sanction in the election of the president there was an opening and we took the opening to pursue negotiations. of course it took a while to negotiate, but they also demonstrated the enormous value of having extraordinary diplomat to solve hard problems.

here again the tag team of john kerry in ernie monets hold a great example for the future in terms of how we address these issues. we all found ourselves in meetings that salt lake basic nuclear physics lesson at times. he was down at the level of detail, but ultimately that make an enormous amount of difference. in the process we benefited outside the government. there's been a little bit of commentary recently. but the obvious truth is based at the white house has to convince the arms control association or anybody else to defend the iran deal did you thought about these issues for many years. he advocated for diplomacy. he shared ideas about what he took a book like before we had one and the halt in negotiations. i think that's an underappreciated element of the work that was done. the tough issues to solve in

many different areas around verification, around how we think about the design of the program and we were able to draw from the advice of outsiders thinking through ways to get over a hurdle that was that or to get around the challenge of the negotiation. all of that input was essential. many other allies defended the deal. other aspects of our nuclear policy right after. i would say for critics it is easier sometimes to have a debate about messaging than the result of the deal itself because the results speak for themselves. iran has taken significant steps to roll back its program and cut off his pathways to a nuclear weapon, steps that have been identified by the iaea. these are facts that match i would describe the deal last summer. to address the enriched uranium pathway, iran dismantled and placed two thirds of it

centrifuges. they ship 90% of their uranium stockpile out of the country, enough for 10 nuclear bombs. iran's stockpile is now less than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched at no more than 3.67%. iran is enriching him at one facility an effect tv is under 24/7 iaea monitoring. two addressable tonia pathway, the core of the iraq reactors and other with concrete rendering holy inoperable now and in the future. before this deal, iran's breakout time to gain when it are weapon was the estimated two to three months. today we take about a year and if they cheat, we won't know because this just objects iran to the most comprehensive nuclear exceptions have been negotiated. the iaea reports on implementation, the most recent last week continued to indicate iran was in line with its commitment. iaea inspectors remain on the ground combat in ongoing and

keeping a watchful eye on iran's entire nuclear supply chain for building and mining to spending fuel come which gives a far greater capacity to detect a covert breakout scenario that we would have with no deal. part of what we were able to do is learn from some of the challenges in north korea and the regime that was much broader that encompasses not just the additional protocol, but the entire nuclear supply chain and hopefully this may be a type of model that could be drawn from in the future as we look to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. but the iran deal committee united states and allies and partners did more than was a specific security challenge. the effort demonstrated diplomacy with the most complicated adversaries can stop the spread of nuclear weapons which should make this the first cold war administration with not another nation acquiring nuclear weapon during the time in

office. the truth is iran took up an enormous amount of time and energy building the sanctions regime, negotiated a deal, ensuring it could be implemented. i know there are other areas where more work needs to be done. let me give you a sense of how we are looking at the last seven months. president obama has shown he is not unwilling to work through the tape as that will. we have many sports metaphors i will add that one too. we have not stopped the advance of north korea's nuclear program and the continued testing of both nuclear weapons and missile systems by the north koreans is the most serious proliferation challenge we face in the world today. the recent u.n. security council resolution does impose the toughest sanctions north korea has ever faced and if implemented can have a significant difference. as a further indication the international community coming putting china is taken very seriously the provocations coming out or korea. we've also worked hard to cut off the greatest capacity to sell the material overseas

trying to break the relationships to the defense partners. and make it clear they presume their program they they are tightening north korea so they are not the proliferator the defense systems in northeast asia. this'll be a a priority for this administration. we have not been able to -- beyond new star. the negotiations with russia, the largest obstacle has been president clinton's unwillingness to come to the table and given all that's happened between our countries it's easy to forget one of the main reasons we can't plan moscow in 2013 is we have nothing to talk about in this particular space. we have not been able to secure affordable material. this has been impacted by russia's reduced in disaster for shared initiatives of law with

the number to proceed cautiously on this issue. pakistan has treated the production of fissile material for productions. we have not been able to ratify the test century. in her first years in office the priority was new start and getting that through wasn't easy. many people in this room may have scars from that fight this seemed like a tough one until the iran one. following the 2010 midterm election, the senate changed and we have not seen a bible pathway in the senate. finally, i know the scales of the planned modernization program has generated a lot of debate and opposition in the arms control. president obama was clear about the need to sustain a strong deterrent to my boss investigated in the systems in a nuclear weapons less relevant to strategic plans. we take the arguments made on different sides of the issue. where does that leave us?

i can promise you today president obama is continuing to review a number of ways he cannot dance the prague agenda over the course of the next seven months. but simply our work is not done on this issue. it is not a closed account. this is something we're actively working in actively reviewing a number of different proposals. with respect to her stockpile, president obama decided to accelerate the dismantlement by 20% and we will continue to look at how we address are not deployed weapons. ..

a. >> finally it is a simple fact of the monetization plan was put together in a different budget environment with a different congress and varied expectations about arms control efforts going forward. our administration has made play are concerned about a monetization budget will force the difficult trade-offs in the coming decades. the president will review these plans as he considered how he wants to hand the baton off to his successor. this is something we will be continuing to look very carefully at. the other thing the president will do is speak about these issues as he did in hiroshima. one of the questions i sometimes get is whether the president should put forward such an ambitious even idealistic vision in prague. wipe afford a host of goals knowing full well that not all of them would be achieved even during two terms in office? let me close with a few thoughts

on why that ambition and even that idealism is entirely necessary. first, in a city, washington, and a world where you almost always have to settle for half a loaf, you sometimes have to start by pursuing the very biggest loaf possible. the goals set by progress so big they could make a star progress look smaller and that's fine. as the president repeated in hiroshima can we may not achieve the goal of a nuclear come of a world without nuclear weapons in our lifetimes, even if daryl has argued about that formulation, but we can set a course and move in that direction and we can do what we can with our time and set a path with it makes it easier for the course to be followed in the future. and second let me return to that john f. kerry speech at american university where he said the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war. free willy the words of the pursuers fall on deaf ears. of course, those words are just as true today. and that is why the comparative

-- is imperative we force these issues back into the public conversation, pushback for suggesting it is not worth the effort that if we do our part, defeat a moral awakening around these issues. because again the further we get from use of nuclear weapons, or the more distant some of the challenges in the world may seem from the united states, the easier it is to get complacent. sometimes i think it takes a putting forward a significant vision and enforcing of a conversation that would otherwise happen to make the progress that is necessary. so as the president made clear in hiroshima, ensuring a nuclear weapon is to be used again is not simply a matter of arms control. it's a matter of how are when we are able to choose peace over war. and no president or even succession of just presidents can fulfill the prague agenda in a vacuum. it will require cooperation from congress.

it will require a change in global dynamics, just as we're able to reach an agreement with iran, it will require continued work with respect to our relationship with russia, continued progress even when it seems intractable in the korean peninsula. the ability to pursue diplomacy in south asia and beyond. ultimately, the diplomatic work that allows for custody built is just as essential as the arms control work that charts a pathway for the reduction at ultimate destruction of stockpiles and nuclear weapons. and that begin with the core message the president had in hiroshima, this combination of the need for arms control efforts coupled with the need to reinvigorate efforts to avoid the type of conflict and attractive building track and put us on a pathway to nations seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and old we, tragically a nation using a nuclear weapon.

so it's easy to say that's impossible. it's very easy to say that we can't possibly envision a we're going to get around some of the structural impediments to eliminating nuclear weapons today, but if you go to hiroshima, that tells you that history can change and that it should change. when we were driving in from the airport we were surprised to see huge and very friendly crowds greeting the presidential motorcade. it's not something i think we could of imagined seven years ago with the kind in japan would have a friendship like they do today. presidential motorcade drive pretty fast but every now and then you're able to kind of lock-in on a face in the crowd. and for me it was a small japanese boy who was smiling and holding a sign in english that you said welcome to hiroshima. when you see that, of course you think about what happened to the

child 71 years ago. if you were standing in the same place. but you also think about the necessity of the work that is done to assure that that never happens. and again it's work that includes what we are doing to fulfill a vision related to arms control but also what we're doing to forge the type of relationship that we have with japan and that we've sought to build with many other countries around the world. so i had to say, let me conclude by saying that the work that's done by groups like the aca in many of you is essential to this effort the only way government can pay attention is when citizens and civil society and advocacy groups insist that the voice be heard. it is ultimately i think if you put this to the people everywhere, generally they would favor a world without nuclear weapons and the world without that catastrophe. what we do have i think it is

the assurance that this is the right work to be doing and our differences about tactics but for the next seven much we look forward to continuing dialogue with you all. we look forward to will be complete in our time in office and we hope to continue to work on these issues t, those of us n the government, even after january 20, 2017 from not the that his circle on my calendar or anything. so thank you all very much. [laughter] [applause] >> thank you very much. we have a good deal of the amount of time for your questions. and let me just note just as a logistical note, that my stuff will be coming around taking some questions that some of your britain on these three by five cards. we will try to get as many as possible but we will start with questions from journalists who are here. i would just ask that you raised

your hand. paul, a microphone will come to you. we will start with a gentleman in the front. >> as you know, the administration -- [inaudible] separate items in the budget, crossing between 350 -- [inaudible] >> can't hear you. >> closer. >> so come as i mentioned at the administration's modernization program consists of hundreds of items, and i just wondered since you said you are reviewing the modernization program if you could just two or three that might be, that unde are near thp of the list for potentially tweeting or eliminating? >> -- tweeting. first of all i'm not going to be

specific because i mentors is just that we have made a determination about that aspect of the modernization budget. i guess what i would say is we recognize that the plan was developed, as i said at a different time when we, number one, anticipated a different budgetary picture going for, to go with respect to our defense budget. some of the plane was built in the context of an earlier congress, including related to the new s.t.a.r.t. ratification process. but also with an expectation that we might be able to further a long in our own negotiations by further reductions with russia. and, frankly, we now sit at a point where we absolutely

believe in the necessity of maintaining and sustaining an effective and credible deterrent. so this would have to be a significant investment in that. the question presented is simply whether or not the skill of the plan fits into the long-term budgetary picture. what trade-offs with that force on future administration, including on important conventional capabilities, and had we've essentially what to leave this issue or at least leave the next administration with dozens of the president obama believes we should move forward. so we will be looking at the plan, forces in the budget but if we determine that we want to be more specific of course, you will hear from us to i think i just want to indicate indian that this and other issues are not close to us.

we heard from the last, the last of the president on this, not just this but a number of areas i think we want to continue to explore it is there anything left to be done the next seven months back and again both advance the agenda of the president said in prague and also i think indicate what we believe our priority should be going forward. >> reporters questions. still here in the middle with rachel, thank you. >> my question has to do with secondary sanctions on north korea. recognizing that china signed off on security council sanctions or a toshiba also recognizing that sanctions earlier by obama. how long will the administration wait to designate chinese banks that seem to be supporting

china's invasion of the sanctions, recognizing that you recently did designate them as a money-laundering? >> so first of all, china supported through the u.n. security council resolution and much more robust international sanction regime than that previously existed. and simply the implementation of those sanctions as it relates to shipments into and out of north korea and relates to other efforts undertaken by the international community we believe that have a positive impact. at the same time with respect to the legislation the president signed, it is always our preference and we believe the i ran case proves this to be effective, that we work in cooperation with other countries so that they are helping to enforce sanctions. so the iran incident of course we did need to impose as many

secondary sanctions because we got other nations, banks and others to work with us. i think we are in a period now where we having a dialogue with china about sanctions implementation. currently in the strategic and economic dialogue and jack lew, i've just been addressing this among many other topics. what we're going to try to do in the near term is work with china so that they are cooperative in enforcing sanctions that ultimately we believe that will be most effective. and so that would make our preference and, of course, we'll be able to evaluate going forward the strength of chinese implementation. >> i'll take a couple more questions from reporters here. yes, ma'am, with the pink. and then we will come over here on the right. sherman, thank you. please identify yourself. >> stephanie cook nuclear

intelligence weekly your i have a question with prime minister mujahideen in town this weekend efforts by the white house to secure nuclear suppliers group approval for full membership. the people i spoke with the in the nsg are a poster that are worried that full membership will allow india to gain access to more advanced reprocessing and enrichment technology benefit their nuclear weapons program. and it also obviously ratchet up pressure by pakistan and israel, both of whom have sent matter causing some kind of membership status. i wonder if you could tell us how that effort by the white house secure more support and how do you connect that to your support for a strong nonproliferation treaty, given that there is a precedent now

for npt never ships was not a de facto requirement for nsg but not a hard and fast but still there is this question of npt membership. >> it's a good question. i mean, it's what i would say is having gone down the path of the civil nuclear agreement with india and having invested a significant amount of time in building up our cooperation with india as relates to nuclear security and again civil nuclear capacity, we are at the point where we believe that engaging india and trying to bring them into international processes will be more effective in promoting their security protocols and investing them in the type of peaceful nuclear

cooperation that does exist globally. and, frankly, it takes place against continued conversations that we have with india about their approach to nuclear weapons. and, of course, the support we've always expressed for diplomatic efforts between india and pakistan. i think the bottom line for us is that we believe to engage with india and through engagement with groups like the nsg, we are in a better position to support india as a good citizen on these issues going forward. of course we will take it seriously the concerns of other nations, but again for us i think this is part of a broader context where we decided to take this approach with india, and we have seen a bear some fruit, particularly on issues related to nuclear security. so again we understand the

concerns but in many ways we are dealing with a challenge that was fairly far advanced by the time we took office, and we decided to sustain the previous administration's decision to pursue that civil nuclear cooperation broadly. dimbleby tried it is masked in the international bodies and protocols so that i can india is in a stronger position to be a good citizen on proliferation with regard to these issues. >> that's one of the 1000 working males i sent to try for. a number of us would think of the other ways to pursue mainstream india and pakistan by raising the standards. but let's continue with other questions. go to the right side, sherman, and then we will go to the back for questions.

>> exchange monitor publication. so the latest nuclear weapons stockpile numbers really seem to suggest slow down our stockpile reductions -- throughout the obama administration. could you speak a little bit about how does that fit into the president's impending legacy a state in the proxy? >> so essentially we've had the reductions and deployed into the new s.t.a.r.t., authorized 20% retirement of nondeployed, nondeployed stockpile. so we sought to try to set markers that is a lot as to reduce both the to put stockpile and the nondeployed stockpile. you know, the lower you get,

obviously the more complex the reductions get. and that's partially why it was our determination that we would want to pursue more ambitious reductions through a negotiated agreement with russia, ultimately with other nuclear states. i think on this issue as i mentioned of the nondeployed weapons, so-called hedge, we sought to be more transparent about that. that's something we'll continue to look at. and that's why the president decided to set down a marker in that area. but the fact of the matter is, again, alone the stockpile number gets, the more you feel compelled to ensure that you are working through a prism of arms control that can hopefully bring in russia can even as i think we can make our own decisions particularly about the numbers we feel are required deployed but also nondeployed your.

>> let's take a question in the rear by the camera there, if we can make our way with the microphone. thank you. >> voice of america, persian news tv network, serve. your first maybe 10-12 minutes of your speech was focus on iran and president obama's achievement in every state. despite that iran continues pursuing the ballistic missile program and capable of carrying nuclear warhead. last week two of the democratic and senior democrat senators, senator tim jane and chris murphy proposed renewal and extension of the iran nuclear, iran sanctions act into congre

congress. but what the white house, state department chordata for implementation in congress during the recent weeks was insisting that this might be -- [inaudible] this nuclear, the sanctions act only kicks in if iran gets out of the deal or violates the deal. what is the white house estimate, reluctant to endorse it, and mr. obama? >> so let me address just the number of elements in the question. number one, we were very clear in the advocacy for the implementation of the iran deal. that this is focus on the

nuclear program. and i think we were very straightforward that we fully expected that iran will continue to engage in other activities that we found deeply troubling, like explosive missile program, its support for terrorism, destabilize activity in the region, human rights violations. and, frankly, the case with me this is all the more imperative to have a nuclear agreement with a country like that because you don't want a country that has a ballistic missile program and destabilize its region, to access to a nuclear weapon. and so the first point here is that sometimes when i hear people say that the advent you has to stop its of the behavior, we said over and over and over again that the of india was focus on the nuclear program, and that we would have of the means of dealing with those other elements of iranian behavior. so that leads me to the second point, which is where the building and the we have a significant sanctions that would

with you on iran for its illicit missile program, for some of its other activities in the region. we had even since the implications of the nuclear deal designated additional individuals and entities under the sanctions. so we are entirely comfortable and clear about the fact that we may have to pursue additional sanctions if iran continues to violate basic international norms as it relates to the ballistic missile broke programr support for terrorism, for instance. with respected legislation, i think the main point we made at carcass is that we have to have the ability to work with them to make sure that legislation in this space does not in any way conflict with our jcpoa commitments. and so we are going to be able to work with congress as

necessary to continue to enforce sanctions in these other it. the question is if people are designing new legislation does it interfere with the commitments we have to fulfill the jcpoa. one thing i would say is one of the warnings during the debate was that there would get $150 billion. we've actually had the opposite challenge which is being that very great difficulty in accessing sanctions relief recess because with so many other sanctions related to iran that banks are uncomfortable doing business. so there's not been a problem of this windfall to the iranians. on the other point that is expiring at the end of this year. but we said to congress is we will continue to have a discussion with them about various ideas that they have related to iran sanctions, and we don't think stuff has to happen now, we have done given the fact that is a piece of legislation that expires at the end of the year. and that whatever we work with

congress on is going to have to be able to protect the ability of the united states to meet its commitment under the jcpoa can't even as it's going to sustained a very strong sanctions authorities that we have and are using. and all these other areas. >> take this question, gentlemen in the yellow. if you can make it short that would be great. >> i wanted to ask about when coupled of the nuclear modernization plan to a long range cruise missile, the new nuclear cruise missile. as president obama was traveling to hiroshima senator markey give a speech on the far we have some choice words about the etiquette just say that he would break the bank in the 2020s and it was way so. he said it wa was dangerous, i o think about of modernization most likely to lead to catastrophic nuclear escalation. how to respond to the criticism? more broadly what are you going forward with that program? >> is another issue i got an

e-mail from daryl about. [laughter] again, i'm not going to get into the individual capabilities. what i will say is we've looked at this and a number of ways. we've tried to determine what capabilities do we have to maintain, both in terms of stockpile and delivery systems, so that we can maintain a credible deterrent, eddie deterrent that can sustain itself for the coming decades as we hopefully are pursuing additional reductions. at the same time, we have tried to look at ways in which we can change our own way of doing business to make it certainly less likely that it is an inadvertent launch, and so the efforts that we took carefully

looking at the launched under attack contingency plan is meant to try to create some additional space in this area. we will look at other, we are constantly reviewing of the ways in which we are reducing the risk of an inadvertent use of a delivery system. so that's the second point i would they pick the last point i would make is again, we will look at this issue comprehensive look, and one of the challenges with cruise missiles is it's the area where i think some of the other nuclear states have been the least inclined to entertain stringent restrictions. so there is the additional question essential but how are

you looking at different delivery systems in the context of broader arms control. so again i know that's a long way of saying essentially we recognize the concerns of been raised about this. that has been our thinking on this. we want to reduce the risk of inadvertent catastrophe. senator markey alluded to. but we also have to operate in the context of both sustaining our deterrent and being mindful of the capabilities of other countries. >> we are running short on time and i want to get to three representative questions from the audience. trying to sort through some of the most popular issues that have not been addressed. so i'm going to ask you these the question that i think we'll be close to the end of our time by the time you answer. sort of religious some of the question that we've already heard come you said in your remarks that president obama has

reduced launched under attack contingency planning for nuclear come in our war plan. can you provide an example of how this has been done? and if you can't today, perhaps, would you say something that i think is community is, in terms of what that means come in terms of operational operations. second question in a different era to we heard earlier today in great detail from joel wit about the expanding nuclear missile threat from north korea. he argued that the existing policy such as they are, even sanctions, tougher sanctions are not effective enough, if we continue on the current course, looking at a much more dangerous north korea by the end of the next president's term. so a question from the audience is what is president obama considered in terms of the

diplomatic side, we engaging in some way or another with north korea directly come in directly to the six-party process to hand off include the next administration a better situation with which, a better set of tools to deal with it. and then third question what you think is very interesting, one for all of us to ponder. as you said in your remarks, achieving progress on these issues depends on a lot of different factors, not just presidential leadership but public awareness, congressional leadership. and we've seen just in the last four or five years since the new s.t.a.r.t., debates, the departure from the senate from some of the heavyweights in the nuclear policy space, people look to for leadership of the republican side and the democratic second people like dick lugar and john kerry. how important upon reflection of

the past seven years how important is about coming on board will that be going forward for the next president to achieve the progress we need to achieve? >> well, those are all very good questions. look, i'm the first one comment we made efforts in our own guidance to be more transparent in sharing our thinking and objectives. when you get into very specific operational contingencies, i think that's where that becomes more difficult. this is something that ultimately becomes quite sensitive. the basic principle again was reviewing our contingencies so that there is a degree of decision space that creates an additional hedge against the risk of launched a we will continue to review i guess what

ways we can be more transparent about these and other elements of our approaches. the second one, on dprk, i think what we are doing is, we are concerned as the president said by this pattern of behavior that escalated in recent months and years. we are particularly concerned by the efforts to try to marry a nuclear capability with a more advanced missile capability. that implicates our security in very dangerous ways. at all but, of course, threatens our allies and our americans who are serving in northeast asia. so in the first instance, he's taking steps to try to enhance our defenses against that threat, while as i said trying to increase both pressure on north korea but court -- but cut

north korea off from the billy to proliferate. on the diplomacy, we have been, we have an open to pursuing diplomatic efforts with north korea. we wanted to be in the context of coordination with our allies, japan and the republican of korea and with china, given the significant influence of they have. the way in which the president thinks about this is that we would need to be assured that there was some recognition and effort by the north koreans that indicates that what we are talking about is denuclearization. and again that doesn't mean we expect that they on the front end would give up their entire nuclear program, as much as we would like it to be the case, but we have to try to find some opening within which we are coming to the table to discuss

these issues and we are coming to the table around approaches i could begin to get at the threat posed by north korea with the ultimate outcome of denuclearization. so we'll be open to that for the remaining time that we have in office. it's something we constantly talk to reporters about. but we have not had a signal of services from the north koreans on those issues today. i think this will be come it's interesting how much attention iran gets. this is an enormous challenge that i think this will be front and center for us and for the next administration. in terms of the changing dynamics, i would say two things. one of the interesting things and this relates to north korea is, you don't know what exact opening is going to present itself. so what's interesting in what does that gives we had an open

with russia for four years, and i think people kind of look back and they say these guys must be second-guessing the reset. but the fact of the matter is, we had an open and with the opening come and because of that we're able to get a new s.t.a.r.t., and lock in those reductions in the verification. and w we're able to get at a radio. because at some russian cooperation with u.n. security council resolution 192 1929 ande sanctions, it did in the diplomacy to i don't think you get and iran deal. and russia looks very different. and iran, and again, i know this is been a subject of controversy but, frankly, we were not getting anywhere in the nuclear discussions. and then in part because of the sanctions come in part because of the elections it was new leadership and iran and they're willing to come to the table. i say that can make the point that you don't know what opportunities going to be that the next four or eight years. you don't know whether the monkey some progress between

india and pakistan we don't know if there might be a shift in mindset and russia, or you don't know certainly people of our time just exactly what's going on inside kim jong-un's head. one of the biggest lessons i've learned is you have to take the opportunity that is there to make progress on issues. other issues will be stuck in these dynamics that are beyond your control sometimes. that i think is an important kind of thing to keep in mind, to look at where do we see some sliver of an opening that we can drive through, whether that is on the korean peninsula whether that's in south asia or anywhere else. that i think the mindset that will be important for anybody in these jobs. with respect to congress, i totally see the point. i worked for some years for lee hamilton who was kind of in that vein, and saw just how essential the congressional leadership was in this space. it was a congressionally led

arms-control generally had to be congressionally led in ways that were very important to early in our administration is an obama, one of his closest mentors innocent was dick lugar, every console to close with him. you the same kind of exodus i think a certain generation, particularly senators. i think that it makes it all the more imperative that the our efforts made to ensure that as people are in the house where people are coming in the senate that is a dedicated effort to raise the profile of arms control and nuclear issues so people are developing that type of career long degree of expertise. so it's not just showing up in a senate office and say i would like you to support this because i to invest in people in the

type of deep understanding of these issues that were so evident and the people you mentioned. and, because opposite that there's kind of, there's always a reason to not pursue an arms-control effort or there's always a reason to prep sustained a certain capability. so there has to be i think a concerted effort in both parties to try to kind of raise the awareness around arms control issues and try, at the staff and member level, ensure that engagement doesn't just happen when there's some big debate but it happens constantly because again, the final thing i will say on this, i ran, i was or interest. people were part of the dugout and becomes part of the issues. but part of that is because people have to focus on iran a lot in congress so that i would have a baseline of

understanding. so again a plug for you guys but i think that's why constant and consistent engagement on the issue so important with congress was not just showing up to complain about something after it's happened. not that you did it anyway. i'm just saying. that can be a problem. >> listen, we have taken up this hour with ben rhodes that are but want to express our appreciation of our associations appreciation for your willingness to come by and subject yourself to our mild interrogation here at the end of your talk about sort of reflecting on the propaganda and what's been accomplished, what more needs to be done. we look forward to working with you and the president and his team on the work that's left to be done. and we will tear it out to do with the issues that we've been discussing it today to continue discussing this afternoon. so please, everyone, join me in thanking ben rhodes.

[applause] >> and we're going to adjourn for about seven to 10 minutes before the next panel begins. so take a quick break and be back in your seats. thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> a break now from the table and forum on national security policy posted by the arms-control association. while we wait for them to return we could hear from an earlier speaker, a survivor of the hiroshima bombing during world war ii, setsuko thurlow. >> thank you very much all. as you saw, humbled and pleased to receive this beautiful gift.

i'm very happy to be here this morning and to meet with you and to receive this honor, and have the chance to talk something about, a little bit about my age periods us and thoughts and feelings about nuclear weapons. i just made a last minute change in my plans. i'm just speaking from the heart, just put the paper a way. really it was a total shock, surprise, to learn that i was going to receive this award from this organization. especially when i learned that people around the world voted for me. well, i didn't realize that i

had so many friends around the world, but, well, i felt it was a miracle that i received this. and not only i up my fellow colleagues, the members of the hibakusha association in japan. they are together remembered and honored with me. so on their behalf as well, let me give you my heartfelt thank you. thank you. now, i use the word miracle lightly, but really 71 years ago i did experience a miracle, and here i am in your company today. so i thought i would share my personal experience with you. i know many of you experts, arms

control specialists and i'm sure you are quite well informed and knowledgeable of all kinds of human conditions, including the human consequences of nuclear weapons. but i thought i would offer my personal and firsthand experience. in 1945 i was a 13 year old, grade eight student in the girls school. and on that very day i was at the army headquarters, a group of about 30 girls had been recruited and trained to do the

decoding work of the top secret information. can you imagine, 13 year old girl doing such important thing? that shows how desperate japan. i met the girls in front of the station at 8:00. know, before 8:00. at 8:00 into military headquarters which was 1.8 obama utters from the ground zero. i was on the second floor and started the morning assembly, and later they gave us to talk. proving your patriot for emperor. and we said yes, sir, we do our best to win we said that i saw the blue white flag in the window, and then i had the contagion of food at the bigger. when i begin consciousness,

total darkness, i distinctly try to move my body. i couldn't move it. so i knew i was faced with death. then i started hearing whispering voices of the girls around the. guard, help me. mother, help me. i'm here. so i knew i was surrounded by them, although i couldn't see anybody. then suddenly the strong male voice, don't give up. i'm trying to free you. he kept shaking my left shoulder from behind. he pushed me and keep kicking, keep pushing, and juicy the sun coming through that opening, and get out that way. crawl as quickly as possible. and by the time i came out of the building it was on fire. .net about 30 of the girls who were with me in the same place were burned to death.

but two other girls managed to come out, so three of us looked on them. although that happened in the morning, it was very dark, like twilight. and i started seeing some moving dark objects approaching to me. and they happen to be streams of human beings, slowly shuffling from the center part of the city to where i was. they didn't look like human beings. their hair was standing straight up, burned black and, bleeding. parts of the bodies were missing. their skin and flesh were hanging from the bones. and some were carrying their own eyeballs, you know, hanging from

the eyesockets. and as they collapsed onto the ground, the sun burst open with sunshine stretching out, and the soldiers said, well, you girls joined the procession to escape to the nearby hills. that's what we did by carefully stepping over the dead bodies, injured bodies. it was a strange situation. nobody was running and screaming for help. they just didn't have that kind of strength left. they were simply whispering water, please. water, please. everybody was asking for water. we girls were relatively lightly injured, so by the time we got to the hillside, we went to the

nearby stream and washed off the blood and dirt, and we tore off the gloves and soak it in the stream and dashed back to put them on, to hold them over the mouth of the dying people. you see, the place we escaped to had a military training ground, huge place, about the size of two football fields. the place was packed with the dead and dying. we want to help, but everybody wanted the water, but no cups and no pockets to carry the water. that's why we went to the rather primitive way of rescue operation. that was all we could do. i looked around and see if there were any doctors and nurses, but

i saw none of them in that huge place. that meant tens of thousands of people in that place without medication, no medical attention, medication, ointment, nothing was provided for them your just a few drops of water from our wet cloth. that was the level of so-called rescue operation we could offer. now, we kept ourselves busy all day doing that. and, of course, all the doctors and nurses were killed, two, just a small percentage of the medical professionals survived, but they were serving people somewhere else, not where i was. so once darkness fell, these three girls --

>> we will get started with our final panel of the meeting which will examine and assess u.s. nuclear weapons spending plans and associate requirements to sustain the. my name is kingston. posted in the room know, the room know, that kind it is planning to rebuild all three legs of the nuclear triad and their associate were has been supporting infrastructure over roughly the next 25 years. at pentagon estimates this modernization effort will cost between 350-$450 billion. excuse me, just find my place. indeed a mammoth cost of nuclear modernization poker republican senator ensign armed services committee chairman john mccain to under the following last month, quote, it's very, very,

very expensive. do we really need the entire triad, given the situation? for the uninitiated among you in the room, questioning the need for the nuclear triad borders on blasphemy in this town. which makes mccain's comments all the more of it take notice moment. likewise, the republican-led house appropriations committee declared in legislation last month that the cost of nuclear modernization quote present i know was affordability challenge. president obama has acknowledged that existing u.s. and global nuclear weapons capabilities are already more than enough. get his administration is pursuing a costly all of the above plan to maintain and upgrade u.s. nuclear forces, force levels that exceed, that exceed deterrence requirements. in fact, nearly every nuclear arms state education and a costly multi-decade effort to modernize and improve the capability of their nuclear weapons and delivery systems. in addition that are not active

bilateral or multilateral negotiations to further regulate, have reduced the stockpiles of any of the world nuclear arms state. this situation has raised concerns of the world stands on the brick of a new nuclear arms race. not a numerical arms race but one toward increasing more advanced nuclear capability that could undermine stability and increase the chances of nuclear weapons use. for export the obama administration appears set aside to pacify the challenges of sosa with nuclear modernization to its successor, the we just heard from ben wrote that the plans were put together in a different budget environment and are continually under review. to watch that space over the next seven months. regardless of what happens during the remainder of the obama administration the next president will likely be faced with a number of increasingly urgent questions about america's nuclear modernization project including its affordability of opportunity costs, impact on the global stability and more.

here at the arms control association we've been raising warnings i was about the cost and insisted of the modernization plans. and i suggested end of the steps that can be taken to put the plate on a more sustainable course. today where happy to continue our engagement with four of the country's leading experts on this issue. to my right is at 13, senior advisor with the csis international secretive program. a joint csis in april 2015 from the office of management and budget we spent more than seven years as chief of the force structure and investment division. next to mark is annual, a specialist in nuclear policy and the foreign affairs defense and trade division of the congressional research service at the library of congress. arguably the plan's leading authority on nuclear strategy. our third speaker will be andrew weber, not as a senior fellow at harvard kennedy school's belfer center piggies serve 30 years and has covered including from 2009-2014 as assistant secretary

of defense for nuclear chemical biological defense programs and also staff director the weapons council. our final speaker will be hans kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the federation of american scientists. they will each provide about 10 minutes of opening part in the order i've introduced. i've asked mark to outline the scope of the current nuclear weapons and to thank him the budget challenge the opposed to the next president and suggest any lessons the previous carter and reagan era nuclear modernization experience teaches us about the coming modernization. amy will provide an overview of the options up to the next president to pay for a just the plans and associate requirements and operational changes and policy changes this would require. and, of course, in the best tradition of the congressional research service, any will do so without any way, shape, or form issuing any opinions on the matter before us today. [laughter] andrew will provide his thoughts on feasibility of the plans and

recommendations for the next president regarding possible adjustments to the pentagon finally hans will highlight the degree to which u.s. nuclear my position is improving or whatever the capability of the modernize forces and the implications of these. with that, mark, the floor is yours. >> thank you very much. i hope you all have the handouts that was interrupted as we talk of budget matters is helpful to charge to refer to. plus i spent many years in the pentagon and after while he was deeply to speak without powerpoint so you'll have to bear with me on that. i'm going to talk about three topics. first is defense budget over all, then the budget for nuclear forces and finally the environment going forward, the challenge is to funding nuclear force of the ongoing to march to the charts quickly. if you have questions feel free to ask me during the q&a session or, on the path towards.

the first chart, the first to charge gives some historical context and i think they are all just a minute so i will go through them quickly. the first one shows dod funding over the last 70 years and i just want to make three points on the chart. the first is the cyclic nature of defense spending the it goes up during times of war in crisis and then comes down when the war or crisis is over. the second is the peak previous experience is much higher than the previous peaks. and the third is that the decline appears to stop. we see a period of hit a ballot and it is a valid that is higher than the previous levels that, previous historical levels. the next chart looks at defense spending as a percentage of gdp, and that's a good measure of burden. here you have both defense spending and debt denominated,

the size of the u.s. economy and there are two points that become apparent here, the first you see the same peak and valley stretches out in the previous charts, the burden goes up during periods before and crisis and then comes out afterwards but the second one is that long-term, the burden has been coming down from their high levels during the 50s and '60s, and then declining since then. the next chart shows we sent fiscal projections. it's a close look at the recent turbulent budget history that we've expressed. a solid black line is the enacted budget level. and the other lines are excessive forecasts that the administration has made about

the future funding your the top line is that gates budget projection. that was made by secretary gates before the budget control act and that was a viable he considered to be the minimum required to i visited the strategy. and you see reference to that sometimes from defense hawks would like to get back to the level and a fully funded defense effort. after that you can see the effect of the budget control act, 2011 to the defense budget goes down quite steeply. first they had to take out $480 billion over 10 years or and then the success of the projections which indicate the inability to make a budget deal and continuing threats about sequestration. one interesting note is that the projections seem to program.

if you take a look at the line with the boxes on it, that's the most recent projection by the administration to end its higher than the earlier projection last year. so that indicates maybe a consensus is building in the congress, i think the broader public and the administration that if you want to execute that strategy, that the ministry has articulated enough to put more money in. the next chart, this is one in fy 2017, future year defense plan, compared to budget gaps and budget deals, added to want to go into all the details of the individual budget just but it just want to make the point that our experience has been a series of short-term budget agreements between the congress and the president. these deals have been at a level

between the sequestration or budget control act level and what the president has been requesting. so if you had to make a guess of what the future is going to look like an u.s.a. that pattern will probably continue to that is, it will not go down as far as the budget control act but it may not be quite as hot as the president has requested. of course there's going to be an election in november so next year could be very different. you could see some sort of discontinuity. .. now i want to talk a little about nuclear budgets, and this is -- sorry, nuclear forces spending. nuclear forces haven't been a budget issue for a long time and the reason is nuclear forces are

capital intensive, once you've bought them they're relatively inexpensive to maintain. that's about to change and nuclear forces will, again, be a budget issue. if you look at the solid line there, you can see what's happened in the past and that is nuclear modernizations have come and there was one set in the early 1960's, you can see the high level on the left and a bump up in the reagan years and now we are heading to another. there are different ways to count. the line there shows what department of defense calls mfp1, strategic forces, and it's prably -- probable the narrowest definition but the department

has published those costs. if you look at the dots that are sort of on the right-hand side, that happens when you add in elements of nuclear costs. the first dot picks up dual-use systems, aerial tankers, the next dot nuclear pieces of department of energy and the final dot picks up a lot of nonweapons, nuclear activity like cleanup and proliferation. the next slide talks about modernization programs and the top left there you see the big modernization programs. i know the other panelists are going to talk about those in detail. i won't. just note that the first two, the bomber and submarine are

likely to be 100 million-dollar programs. i want to discuss something that doesn't really get attention, that's the funding for nnsa, national nuclear security administration, because of the way the budget caps are constructed nnsa and dod fall in the same cap and what that means in the budget world is if you want to give an extra dollar for nnsa for nuclear weapons, you have to take it away from dod. and that sets up a budget dynamic. it means you have a discussion about what's more important, is it more important to put a dollar here or a dollar here. but also means that you have two scorpians in a bottle and whose requirement is more important. for a number of years when nnsa

had cost overreturns, they had to combat the dod and ask for more money. dod became reluctant giving more money and therefore should go back and find -- offset internally. i think the dynamic is going to continue and periodically breaks out to the public. the reason it's going to continue are the bullets i list in the box there. a letter sent to omb saying there's allot of additional costs for nnsa that he's going to need additional funds in the future. what that means is those costs become manifest and money will come from dod and it's going to be a very sharp disagreement there. on the next slide there we get

to the wave, the individual bars there, you can see the fiscal demands by year. this chart comes out of a work, study that was done by one of my colleagues, today -- todd harrison. you see the major increase in fiscal demands. 20-21. those were also inside the department's five-year plan and the department has to make trade-offs to accommodate those fiscal demands. also note that the nuclear biowave is not the only set of demand that the department is going to face. there's increasing demand for personnel costs, modernization of the conventional forces because the way that todd did his chart here does not include most of the cost of the bombers

because he argued it was a conventional capability. plus, you have increases in the onm funding, operation of maintenance that goes up every year and possibly war funding which is provided a safety valve for the department. then in the last chart you can see the burden that that will put on to the department. on one level, you can argue that it's not that large an increase, it goes from above 3% of the department's budget to about 5%. not a huge increase in itself, and you could accommodate it with some trade-offs with other programs.

now trade-offs are always very painful but certainly can be done and if the department is committed to the nuclear modernization programs, they could cut other programs to find the funding. my wife and i have these conversations all of the time. we can't afford anything, we just can't afford everything. if you look back in the 60's, modernization then and the modernization under reagan the department line went up to accommodate nuclear program, environment of increasing resources, it was not having having to take resources from other programs and, indeed, that the budget turns around the department may be able to do that but if the budget environment continues to as it has for the last couple of years, then it's going to have to make some very difficult trade-offs. and my personal guess is that

when those trade-offs start to become apparent, you're going to see a lot more discussion about options on the nuclear programs. so far they haven't made that fiscal demands, they haven't had to make a lot of trade-offs so they sort of come in under the radar so to speak. when you start making trade-offs, people are going to start making tough questions, bombers, can want it be a stand-off bomber and i will leave that to my other panelists. >> i should mention that we did distribute the slides and you also have slides for han's presentation as well. >> ignore everything that kingston said. yes, as crs analyst i often know opinions and we will just provide facts and figures, in the off chance that an opinion

speaks out, send it to me and not to sierra. i was going to start by sketching but i don't have to do that because you have the awes in front of you and might want to keep those open. i'm going to pick up exactly when we just ended. when the trade-offs come in 2020, what are the options of the next administration to flatten out or extend or eliminate the wave given it's not pentagon problem. the navy wants to buy a bunch of otherships and they have within budgets make trade-offs. as the air force buys a new bomber be it conventional ben traiting or not, it also wants to buy tankers and that's 35

aircraft, as the air force buys icbm's and cruise missiles it should do it as bombers and f-35's. the bio wave is not just nuclear, there's going to be huge production and procurement bills to pay. what wing stone asked me to address what choices could you make to get in under to reduce it or stretch it out. since you have the pictures, i don't have to draw a biowave. there's generally three analytic ways. each of them has benefits and costs and each of them has implications to the nuclear force. first one is you can delay the program or delay some of the programs, sequence them out better so you don't try to buy

stuff between 2025 and 2027 and if you buy some sooner and some later then you taken that peak and stretched it. that would seem to make sense except for within the nuclear program, the reason they're buying everything now or in the next ten years is because the things we have are getting old. and those within the pentagon at some point the old stuff is going to introduce risks into your capabilities or even damage or danger into your capabilities. you have submarines that are approaching the end of their service life. you can't get them past 42 years because they have nuclear reactors on them. you're going to run out of fuel the second time. it has to go under water and come back up. there are risks of keeping them around too long. there are also costs. we have replaced most of the pieces and parts.

that actually costs a lot, maybe not as much as a new missile but there are costs. so the pentagon would tell you the reason we are buying these things in the next 10-15 years is because the ones that we have are aging out. if you try and delay them or sequence them you may get to the point that the people in place you're introducing risks and you're also undermining the capability to meet the requirements. if you introduce risk in your sub submarine force, the navy will tell you we can't operate the way we operate now and we have a requirement to meet our needs by operating the way we have to operate now. it's not a budget decision. it's not a decision made and

would have implications for the pentagon. second reason, you could stretch the programs out but as any good budgeteer would tell you, the longer it's going to cost. there's some increment of funding of 10% by making it go slower. now if you're trying to fit into your budget for the next year or the pentagon for the next five years, you don't worry about that. you're stretching it out, get those numbers, you flatten the awe and get under the ceiling now and worry about costs later. there's a technical term for that, meddling through. [laughter] >> instead of buying bombers to get you all the bombers you need in early 2030's, you can slow them down. and from the nuclear weapon's community perspective that's fine because the b-52 and the

b-2's are to be around to 2030 and 2040, slowing the new bomber probably wouldn't undermine the nuclear mission. on the other hand, the air force will say it needs bombers to meet convention. so once again, your solution interferes with your operations and meeting the requirements. i'm not arguing that those operations and requirements are set in stone but just for now bare with me, they exist. the third way to address the overwhelming problem of too much money spent and not enough in the budget is to trunkate your programs. buy few we're -- fewer of them. 12 new submarines to fill out two basis or 8200 new bombers, you could buy fewer, but if you're looking at getting into

the bowel wave, doesn't save you money till the out years. if you're the person in congress, the person in pentagon trying to fit the program under the budget this year or the next five years, trunkating the program doesn't help either. when i started working years ago, we were plan to go buy 21 to 24 submarines. within a year we plan today buy 18. we plan today buy 21 and we plan today buy 18 and we now have 14 in the nuclear force. so the numbers and the out years change. anybody remember when we planned to buy 132 brveción-2 bombers until the price tag came out of the black and the president reduced it to 75 until the cold war ended and now it's 21. 20 because we lost one.

it doesn't solve your near-term budget problem. the point i'm trying to make here is that we don't size and structure using budget. the pentagon when it tells the president and omb what it wants it wants to meet requirement. even though someone in the arm's control community could sit down and say, new start gives us 1550 war heads and eight submarines instead of 12. i can do that, i can make the math work but doesn't meet the pentagon to meet its requirements. what requirements i'm talking about? deterrent out of two oceans, submarines from georgia and washington.

if you reduce the number of submarines you interfere with the pentagon's ability to operate forces the way they do now and meet requirements. the requirements are not set in stone. they can change but you would prefer that a question of what our requirements should be with the role of nuclear weapons are and what the mission and the mechanism that we use today meet that role, that that would be made first and the budget after. if you cut the force to meet a budgetary need you may force a less coherent change and requirement. so wouldn't it be nice to do it front to back? as i said, there's a technical the way we do it but one would think that one would want to decide what the requirements and needs are and size accordingly. there are two other ways to solve this bowel wave problem,

one of them as you just heard, raise the top line in the budget. i'm going to ask anyone in the room who thinks we are spending too much money on nuclear weapons because we can't afford it with anything else we want to be buying, would you be okay if you raised the top line of the budget? no, is there any one in the room who would want to do that? no. it's not a monetary issue for you. same thing. you want to cancel some of the programs because they cost too much money, really? if they were free, would you still want to cancel them? probably. having a debate about how much they're worth. and that, again, is an issue of the roles, missions and requirements for nuclear weps and that is the discussion that the obama administration had during its first few years in office when they did a nuclear review and came up with the limits and the plans under new start but then the discussion changed in november of 2011 when

congress passed the budget control act. so now we are having a question -- discussion about how much the weapons cost and how we can afford them under the ceiling set by the budget control act. but ask yourself whether you want to keep having that conversation or you want to go back and have conversation about how much their roles and missions are? i realize it's a difficult conversation, but if you continue thinking about how much they cost, you have to recognize that the people who feel differently from you look at the last chart that's in your packet from before and they only cost 5% of the defense budget. is that so awful? to which one will say there are opportunity costs, there are trade-offs, there are priorities. the problem is not that they cost a huge portion of the fense budget, it's that for

those people who don't want to pursue programs, for other reasons, not because of cost reasons. for those people who do want to pursue programs, they do want to put priority on nuclear weapon's program regardless of the cost. if you're going to have that discussion at the tbinning of the next administration and you continue to have the discussion based on how much these weapons cost rather than how much they are worth, you're not going to make any progress in the debate. if you haven't noticed that debate has been going on for five years. if it requires getting back to a discussion of what they're worth, you may have the ability to find some range of opinion on both sides of the debate where you come to some conclusions. the next administration is going to have to address this, how much they're worth question to figure out how much they can afford to spend.

but i want to remind you even though you've asked the panel to talk about cost, you're really talking about what they're worth. >> excellent. [applause] >> andy. >> i get to have opinions because i retired a year ago. [laughter] >> but you're right. this is about what they're worth and what we need for our safe, secure and effective deterrent. i arranged my talk in sort of two buckets. one is what can the obama administration still do to push through the tape in the next seven months? that's a term that president obama uses frequently and it's a track term for those who haven't heard it before. there's a lot that he can do.

and then i have some longer-term things that the next administration can work on and certainly president obama has a bit opportunity to lay the foundation for that. but first i want to do who is rarely done and that is take credit for what the obama administration has done to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. i was part of that and i'm very proud of what we did. i think the neglect of the previous decade has been reversed. we have in full production the w -76 war head and the heart of our deterrent would be in very good shape.

we made a decision to do a limited life extension program including replacing the conventional explosive on the w-88, the other c-launch ballistic missile. so our c-leg war head situation is on very good shape. we have the replacement program. it's also on a very good path. the big question for that is not do we need them, it's how many do we need and the savings whether you buy 12 boats or ten boats or eight boats, those savings won't be realized until the 2040's, 2050's a long way away. the investments in the nuclear command and control -- command

and control system have been significantly enhanced. without mc2 we don't have nuclear weapons, we can have thousands of them but without that control system, positive control by the president, we don't have a good secure and effective deterrent. and then the b-21 to replace the b-52 and eventually the b-2 is a good investment. i support the new bomber and that program is on a very good path. it's now in early -- early procurement phases or final development testing phases and we need a new bomber and i support that. do we need 60 or a 100? that's a discussion worth having. had we built 60-b2's, we would

have retire it had b-2, 20 years ago. that's our new start. if we had 60b-2's we wouldn't need the b-52 or falcon today. with those significant stead efforts supported on a bipartisan by congress our deterrent is on a good path and our administration deserves credit for that. it's not something that everybody in this room wants to hear but it's something that i believe deeply. now, let's talk about the low-hanginfruit, some of the easier changes that can be made in the next seven months and amy talked about requirements, and that's the right place to start. it's what is the deterrent that we need going forward.

we also need to think about how our modernization investments are viewed around the world and what counterinvestments will they spur. so that's something we don't do -- we don't do very well. the requirements for nuclear weapons are made by one individual, the president obama. it's unlike any other weapon where they are derived through this process that the pentagon call it is requirement's process. these are set by the president and if you look at an amazing case study in history, the 1991 presidential nuclear initiatives that george herbert walker bush led together with collin powell in three weeks they changed the requirements for nuclear weapons . then implemented that. and it just takes a stroke of the pen because the president

himself can determine and does determine the requirements for nuclear weapons. it's a great case study and it's on the indyu website and i recommend it as a good example of what can be done in a very short time. now, the easiest change that the could make today is to retire immediately a weapon that nobody talks about and that's the b-83 gravity bomb. it has yield over one mega ton. and we have in the b-2 we have the b-61 gravity bomb today and we are consolidating four different models into the b61-2

and we can save money, keeps these things around cost money. 30, $40 billion a year just to have them. and over time that adds up to real money. it would also after the visit to hiroshima that we don't need nuclear weapons in the mega ton range of yield. another one that i consider low-hanging fruit is the replacement to the air launch cruise missile lrso. i think it stands for the long-range strike option but it's a new nuclear weapon system that is planned to replace the alcom. this penetrating nuclear missile would be combined the penetrating bombers.